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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts of interest between the majority of employees
and individuals are inevitable when a union engages in collec-
tive bargaining.1 In negotiating and enforcing a contract, a
union is entitled to require some individual sacrifices for the
greater good of the majority.2 The union's discretion to com-
1. The union, as exclusive bargaining agent for the unit of employees it
represents, negotiates and enforces contracts with the unit's employer on be-
half of the individual members. Because the exclusivity of the union's repre-
sentational status causes the problem of conflict of employee interests, one
commentator has recommended scuttling the exclusivity principle. See
Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the Interests of Individ-
ual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L REV. 897 (1975).
2. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). Federal labor policy ac-
knowledges that some individuals will be worse off under a system of collective
bargaining and that their interests may be sacrificed for group gain. J.L Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
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promise individual interests is not without limit, however. The
individual employee has some recourse when he or she can
prove that the union has breached its duty of fair representa-
tion.3 Thus, the standard of union conduct reflected in the
union's duty of fair representation is a primary mechanism for
balancing conflicting group and individual interests.
The conflict between majority and individual interests is
particularly acute in the administration and processing of indi-
vidual grievances by unions against employers. Under current
law, the union controls the grievance process and occupies a
pivotal position in deciding whether to enforce an employee's
claim.4 Once an employee has submitted a grievance to the
union, the union chooses whether to advance the grievance
through the various steps of the process or to reject and aban-
don it. If the union abandons the grievance, arbitration is fore-
closed to the employee. To enforce the contract claim, the
employee must sue the employer in court, but the employee
can obtain judicial review of the merits of the claim only if he
or she proves that the union breached its duty of fair represen-
tation in responding to the grievance.5
Selecting a reliable standard for determining when a union
has breached its duty to employee-grievants is no easy task.
Whatever union conduct is deemed to breach the duty will
have repercussions, not only on the balance of power between
individuals and majorities within the union, but also on the col-
lective strength a union can muster in dealing with the em-
ployer. If the standard of conduct is set too low, rights of
individuals and minority groups may be abused by the union
acting under the influence of the majority. If the standard of
conduct is set too high, special interest minorities may faction-
alize the union, dissipate its collective strength, and impair its
ability to act collectively for the benefit of the majority. Since
the duty of fair representation will be enforced by the courts,
6
3. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
4. A unionized employee may not bring suit against the employer until he
or she has first exhausted existing grievance/arbitration procedures. Republic
Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). Typically, the collective bargaining
agreement specifies that the grievance/arbitration procedure is controlled by
the union rather than the employee-grievant.
5. Those actions in which an employee attempts to sue his or her em-
ployer on an underlying grievance, but must first prove that the union breached
its duty of fair representation, have been referred to as "hybrid § 301 breach-of-
duty actions." See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2
(1980).
6. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). The employee may bring his suit
in federal court under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1976). These suits are commonly referred to as "derivative" § 301 ac-
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the standard must also take into account the appropriate de-
gree of judicial deference to union decisionmaking.
7
Although it has been a focal point of considerable litiga-
tion 8 and scholarship, 9 there is still no consensus regarding the
content of the union's duty of fair representation as a thresh-
hold issue in breach of contract suits brought by employees
against their employers. The few major Supreme Court deci-
sions on the subject speak in broad language that does not fur-
ther the development of predictive tests.10 The many decisions
tions. These suits are termed "derivative" actions because the typical § 301 ac-
tion to enforce the collective bargaining agreement is brought by either the
union or the employer.
The National Labor Relations Board provides an alternative means of en-
forcing the duty of fair representation when the union's conduct constitutes an
unfair labor practice under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(2) (1976). For a full dis-
cussion of the Board's role regarding the duty of fair representation, see Fan-
ning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L REv. 813 (1978). Because an
NLRB determination which is adverse to the employee does not foreclose the
employee from filing suit under § 301, there has been some divergence in the
duty of fair representation concept between § 301 actions brought in court and
complaints alleging union unfair labor practices brought before the NLRB. A
recent opinion of the NLRB's general counsel indicates current Board prefer-
ence to restrict the scope of the duty of fair representation in order to restrict
the case load of the NLRB. See Memorandum 79-55 from John S. Irving, Gen-
eral Counsel for the NLRB to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and
Resident Officers.
This Article refers throughout to the problems confronting the individual
employee who has a grievance. Many of the comments apply equally to the
case of multiple employees who file a class grievance when the number or char-
acter of the group makes them a political minority within the union.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
8. A LEXIS search of cases citing Vaca v. Sipes turns up approximately
1225 listings. Of the numerous suits filed by employees against their employ-
ers, most involve grievances abandoned by unions prior to arbitration.
9. Many of the competing policy arguments involved in actions under the
Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), were identi-
fied and discussed as early as the 1950's by Professors Coy, Summers, Blum-
rosen, and others in the context of a slightly different debate. See Blumrosen,
The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Con-
trol of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIc. L, REV. 1435 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Blumrosen, The Worker]; Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job
Interests: Union-Management Authority v. Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTGERS L.
REV. 631 (1959); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HArv.
L. REV. 609 (1959); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
57 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1958); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L,
REv. 601 (1956); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Ar-
bitration, 37 N.Y.U. L, REV. 362 (1962). At that time, the debate focused on the
question of whether the employee or the union controls the processing of a
grievance. When the Supreme Court answered the question in Vaca v. Sipes,
in 1967, by holding that the union controlled the grievance procedure, but that a
trial court could consider the merits of the employee's breach of contract claim
when the union is found to have breached its duty of fair representation, the
debate shifted to what union actions breach the duty of fair representation in
grievance processing. See articles cited infra notes 61, 65.
10. For discussion of the Supreme Court's development of the duty of fair
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of the Courts of Appeals faithfully recite the broad phrases of
the Supreme Court, but tend to be idiosyncratic."' Adding to
representation, see infra note 51, text accompanying notes 47-52. Only 18
Supreme Court decisions have addressed the union's duty of fair representa-
tion. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554
(1976); Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1960); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957); Synes v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S.
768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Local Fireman, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tur-
stall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). Of these 18 cases, only Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freigh4 Inc., Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, Czosek v. O'Mara, Vaca v. Sipes, Humphrey v.
Moore, and Conley v. Gibson have addressed the issue of the duty of fair repre-
sentation in the contract administration context.
11. The lengthy litigation history of Ruzicka v. General Motors, 336 F.
Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1972), 85 LR.RM. (BNA) 2419 (E.D. Mich. 1973), 86
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2030 (ED. Mich. 1973), rev'd, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), reh'g
denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975), 96 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
vacated, 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cr. 1981), 519 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1981), illus-
trates the idiosyncratic nature of many fair representation cases. Ruzicka, a
union activist employed by General Motors for nearly 11 years, was discharged
by the company in March 1970 for being intoxicated on the job and using abu-
sive language toward his supervisor. He filed a grievance claiming that the dis-
charge was disproportionate to the offense. The union lost in the first two steps
of the grievance procedure. In order to proceed with the grievance, the con-
tract required that the company and the union exchange "statements of unad-
justed grievance." 86 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 2032. The union neglected to file a
timely statement, even though it received two extensions for the exchange
date. Ruzicka claimed that the shop committeemen responsible for processing
his grievance consciously failed to file the statement. After 27 months of unsuc-
cessful efforts to pursue the matter within the union and a refusal from the
NLRB to issue a complaint against the union for breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation, Ruzicka filed suit in federal district court against the company and
the union. The district court dismissed the complaint. Although the court
found that there was some evidence of hostility between the committeemen
and Ruzicka, the court held that mere hostility, without a showing that the
"hostility tainted the official's conduct," was insufficient to establish a breach of
the duty of fair representation. 86 L.RR.M. (BNA) at 2032.
In Ruzicka , the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the union "inexplica-
bly neglected" to file the statement, and that "[s]uch negligent handling of the
grievance, unrelated as it was to the merits of [the] case, amounts to unfair
representation. It is a clear example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a
grievance." 523 F.2d at 310. The Court of Appeals denied the defendants' peti-
tion for a rehearing en bane, stating that its "opinion is [sic] this action speaks
to a narrow range of cases in which unexplained union inaction, amounting to
arbitrary treatment, has barred an employee from access to an established
union-management apparatus for resolving grievances." 528 F.2d at 913.
On remand, the district court ordered that the grievance proceed to arbitra-
tion on the merits, but retained jurisdiction until the matter was settled. On
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the confusion, the duty of fair representation, which initially re-
quired only that unions refrain from certain types of bad faith
conduct, has been expanded so that it now requires unions to
engage in some kind of affirmative conduct. Exactly what af-
firmative conduct is required, however, has not been clearly de-
fined. Thus, the courts have applied negative sanctions to
union conduct which deviates from an, as yet, unspecified
norm. As a result, unions wander through a minefield of con-
fusing and sometimes inconsistent court holdings.12 If judicial
sanctions are intended to improve union representation, court
decisions cannot be deemed successful when they fail to pro-
vide consistent and comprehensible reasons for the sanctions
imposed.
Nor has the scholarly debate to date provided a solution.
Despite the extensive scholarship on the issue, there have been
relatively few attempts by scholars to provide an affirmative
formulation of what a union must do to discharge its duty to a
grievant.13 Although scholars generally recognize the impor-
tance of balancing competing individual and collective inter-
November 11, 1976, the arbitrator decided the grievance in favor of Ruzicka and
awarded him reinstatement with seniority and back pay. See 96 LR.R.M.
(BNA) at 2830. Thereafter Ruzicka moved for summary judgment against the
defendants. The district court denied the motion, in order to allow the defend-
ants to present evidence on the issue of the duty of fair representation. The
district court then heard further testimony from the union. The union argued
that even if the committeemen had failed to fie the statement on time, it was
the past practice of both the union and the company to relax filing deadlines.
The district court rejected the union's argument, stating that evidence of the
past practice was contained on the record before the Court of Appeals, and that
court had "implicitly" rejected the defense when it found the union had
breached its duty of fair representation. See Ruzicka I, 649 F.2d at 1210-11 (ex-
plaining history of case to that time).
In Ruzicka II, the Sixth Circuit again reversed the district court. 649 F.2d
at 1211. The court stated that if the union had in fact relied on past practice
when it failed to file a timely statement, its failure would no longer be consid-
ered "unexplained" and therefore, the union could not be deemed to have
breached its duty of fair representation. Id. The court remanded to the district
court to take further evidence on the shop practice with regard to grievance
filing. Thirteen years after Ruzicka was discharged, and after two appeals to
the circuit court and arbitration, litigation is still proceeding.
12. Compare Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981)
with Hoffman v. Lonza, 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981). For discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. Fear of suit and uncer-
tainty of result may lead union officials to arbitrate some cases unnecessarily
and to abandon some cases in the mistaken belief that they were authorized to
abandon them.
13. For a list of the principal works, see articles cited infra notes 61, 65.
See also infra text accompanying notes 56-70. At least two scholars have at-
tempted affirmative formulations, however. See Summers, The Individual Em-
ployee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair
Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); Clark, The Duty of Fair Represen-
tation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tax. L. REV. 1119 (1973).
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ests, there has been little discussion of how a union should
balance these interests in the wide variety of circumstances
that regularly occur in grievance processing. No single formula
has emerged capable of prescribing how a union should bal-
ance interests in such recurring situations as discharges, plant
closings, or seniority disputes. To date, the predominant ap-
proach has been to view breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion as a tort. Although this conceptualization has continuing
validity in certain circumstances,14 it is less appropriate when a
grievant's basic claim is against the employer and the union
has precluded the employee from enforcing that claim in arbi-
tration. This Article suggests that, by reconceptualizing the
duty of fair representation on the model of due process re-
quired of an administrative agency, the appropriate issues can
be identified, a more definite code of union conduct can be pre-
scribed, and the limits of judicial review can be defined with
greater clarity.
The purpose of this Article is to construct a unified theory
and propose a standard for determining when union conduct, in
failing to advance an employee's grievance, amounts to a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation and, conse-
quently, when an employee is entitled to have the merits of the
grievance heard by a court. Part I examines the complexity of
the problem by identifying the interests of the various parties
in the grievance/arbitration process, examining the purpose of
the duty of fair representation, and reviewing existing propos-
als for standards governing the duty of fair representation. 5
Part 11 proposes a "fair process model" of union behavior in
prearbitration grievance processing. Part HI explains the
model in greater detail and examines its implications in specific
situations. These situations are divided into three categories:
1) union fact finding; 2) union contract interpretation; and
3) nonadjudicatory reasons for terminating grievances. Part IV
evaluates the fair process model in light of the objectives of
federal labor policy.
14. One instance in which the conceptualization of the duty of fair repre-
sentation as a tort has continuing usefulness is when a union is implicated
along with the employer in causing the alleged breach of contract. In addition,
when a union exhibits hostility or discriminatory intent in its representation of
the grievant, the employee may have a cause of action against the union, irre-
spective of any underlying contract claim against the employer.




I. THE NEED FOR A BETTER LEGAL STANDARD OF
UNION CONDUCT IN PROCESSING GRIEVANCES
A. THE VARIOUS INTERESTS IN THE GRIEVANCE/ARBITRATION
PROCESS
Whatever standard of conduct is chosen for the duty of fair
representation in grievance processing, that standard must
take into account the divergent interests of the respective par-
ties in the grievance/arbitration process. 16 The standard will
primarily affect the union-employee relationship; since the em-
ployer is not a party to the duty of fair representation, the em-
ployer's interest in the standard is less direct than that of
either the union or the employee. 17 To the extent possible,
16. All three parties, the employer, the grievant, and the union, have an in-
terest in the ongoing enterprise and hence, an interest in reaching a decision
expediently and with a certain degree of finality. In particular cases, however,
any one of the parties may be willing to jeopardize the expediency and finality
of the process by holding out for a more favorable decision or greater settle-
ment leverage over the others.
Professor Archibald Cox identified five categories of interests potentially
affected by a grievance outcome:
(1) the interests of the union as an organization in recognition, the
union shop, the checkoff, consultation concerning changes in working
conditions, and any form of discrimination against union stewards or
members;
(2) the unassorted interests of employees as a group, such as are in-
volved in preserving the work "belonging to" the bargaining unit or
some segment thereof;
(3) the future interests affected by the law-making aspects of griev-
ance adjustment;
(4) the present interests of employees who may be in competition
with the immediate grievant or who, through the force of comparison,
may gain or lose from the adjustment of the grievance;
(5) the interests of the individual who claims that he has not been
paid correctly or that he has been damaged by the employer's failure to
perform his contract obligations. Manifestly each worker has a strong
and intensely personal interest in his compensation. He did the work.
The money will be his, if recovered. His right is vested in the sense
that the events giving rise to the employer's obligations are past and
the claim is accrued.
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L R.v. 601, 615 (1956). Profes-
sor Cox was addressing what was, at that time, the unsettled issue of whether
the union or the employee should control grievance processing. Now that the
Supreme Court has determined that the union can control grievance process-
ing, the issue has shifted to how the union should exercise that control. The
new formulation of the issue requires consideration of a new category of inter-
ests, those of the respective parties in the fairness and integrity of the griev-
ance procedure itself.
17. The duty of fair representation is primarily of interest to the union,
which owes the obligation, and to the employees, to whom the obligation is
owed. The employer's interest in any grievance is to protect the management
decision which gave rise to the grievance. "Since grievances are almost always
complaints against action taken or refused by the employer, a stalemate means
that the employer's view prevails." Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in La-
bor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1955). In seeking to have its policy
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therefore, the standard chosen should be in keeping with the
union's role in the collective bargaining relationship and should
attempt to accommodate legitimate employee and union inter-
ests in specific grievances and in the arbitration process
generally.
The employee-grievant has two separable interests in any
grievance: an interest in the result and an interest in the fair-
ness of the process that determines the result. In regard to the
former, the employee-grievant seeks to gain whatever benefits
flow from reversing the employer's unilateral decision.18 But
prevail, the employer seeks to protect that interest. As the grievance claim pro-
gresses up the grievance ladder and is in turn appealed to higher and higher
echelons of management, management's interest is reexamined to determine
whether it is worth protecting. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement; 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663, 766-68 (1973). This process gives the
employer the opportunity to exercise a check on lower level managers and to
cure erroneous policy decisions of lower level managers. Higher level manag-
ers may, for personnel reasons, affirm existing decisions in order to back up
managers on the frontline of the decisionmaking process. Cf. Rosenberg, Judi-
cial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22 SYACUSE L. REv. 635,
661 (1971) (discussing appellate courts' overruling of trial court decisions).
The employer also has an interest in the grievance process itself. As a sub-
stitute for strikes and work stoppages, the advantage of the griev-
ance/arbitration process is obvious. In addition, the grievance process provides
the employer with a mechanism for channelling complaints. See Feller, supra,
at 768. Feller argues that even without the federal scheme of collective bargain-
ing and the federal preference for the grievance/arbitration procedure, employ-
ers would find it in their own interest to institute such a procedure. Grievances
are likely to arise in any complex organization, and employers may prefer in-
house arbitration, a less costly, lower risk forum in which they are likely to ex-
ercise greater control over the result, to alternative channels such as court
suits or strikes.
Finally, the employer has an interest in insulating itself from liability for
breach of contract claims made by any of its employees. When the employer
has breached the contract as alleged in the grievance, the employer's interest
in finality need not be of a sufficient degree to be considered and protected in
all cases. The duty of fair representation was not created for the benefit of the
employer, and the union is not the employer's insurer. Even if the bar of final-
ity is lifted on a grievance matter, the employer can defend its actions on the
basis that it did not breach the contract. Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976) (rejecting the argument that an employer can be
protected from relitigation by a contract provision providing that arbitration de-
cisions are final and binding). But see Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103
S. Ct. 588 (1983) (in holding that a union could be held liable for back pay dam-
ages resulting from failure to arbitrate, the Supreme Court indicated that an
employer may rely on the union's decision not to pursue an employee's
grievance).
18. This goal requires the employer's involvement in any forum where the
employee seeks to reverse the management decision. This was one of the ma-
jor policies influencing the Supreme Court to decide that employees need not
exhaust intra-union appeals before bringing suit under Labor Management Re-
lations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Clayton v. International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 451 U.S. 679
(1981). See also Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra-Union
Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L REV. 989 (1980).
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even if the employee reasonably accepts that he or she cannot
succeed on the merits of every grievance, the employee still
has a distinct interest in the fairness of the grievance process
itself, an interest which will be served if the process is capable
of producing a fair decision on the merits. Since, under most
collective bargaining agreements, the grievant is precluded
from participating directly in the grievance/arbitration process,
the grievant's attention focuses on the quality of the union's
representation. Although an unfavorable disposition of the
grievance may not leave the employee happy, the employee
may be willing to accept the result if assured that the union ob-
jectively considered the grievance.19
The union's motives and interests in the griev-
ance/arbitration process are more complex. On the one hand,
the union's interests are the amalgam of all the separate inter-
ests of the employees it represents. On the other hand, the
union is an institutional entity interested in its own perpetua-
tion. For the most part, these interests correlate well. 20 Since
the union is established to advance employee interests, one
would expect the union to want to secure any additional bene-
fits it can for any employee as long as doing so does not inter-
fere with the interests of other employees. 21 As the exclusive
19. Cf. Shulman, supra note 17, at 1019.
20. By assuring the welfare of the bargaining unit, the union insures its
own stability. On occasion the interests of the union as an institution and the
interests of the employees it represents can diverge, however. The union may
be tempted to pursue a goal which benefits itself as an institution but does not
further its ability to represent its bargaining unit. For example, the union may
seek to develop a "sweetheart relationship" with the employer. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir.
1977). Whether the union should be able to advance institutional interests
which are at odds with the interests of the members of its bargaining unit is a
question which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the view
that the union should only be allowed to advance interests of its bargaining
unit, see Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation
in Grievance Administration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1199 (1976).
An alternative model of union behavior would view unions as public spir-
ited, and as seeking the optimal plant policy. Although courts sometimes
ascribe such lofty ideals to unions, see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), there is little evidence that union deci-
sions made by local union officials in grievance processing conform to that
model of foresight and long-range goals. For a discussion of an analogous di-
chotomy of models of local government behavior, see Michelman, Political Mar-
kets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78). For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, it is assumed that the dominant motive of the union is to maximize the
interests of the employees in its bargaining unit.




bargaining agent for all the employees in the bargaining unit,
however, the union must represent the interests of any other
employees which might conflict with those of the grievant.
Since other affected employees are not ordinarily permitted to
intervene in a grievance, their interests must be taken into ac-
count by the union. Thus, the union is concerned with resolv-
ing conflicts arising among employees over grievance issues.
22
As an institutional entity concerned with retaining its sta-
tus as exclusive bargaining agent, the union has an interest in
maintaining credibility both with its members and with the em-
ployer. In order to maintain its position, it must assure the ma-
jority of union members a minimum level of satisfaction. Since
the union negotiated the contract under which the grievance
arises, its interest in contract enforcement is a continuation of
its interest in contract negotiation.23 The union must show its
members that it can deliver what was promised. How the
union resolves a grievance issue may also create a precedent
that will affect future contract negotiations. As negotiator of fu-
ture contracts, the union may want to leave an issue unsettled,
either to preserve room for negotiation on the issue itself or to
retain the issue as a bargaining chip to be traded for employer
concessions in other areas of interest to its members. 24 For the
union to deal effectively with the employer and to maintain its
credibility in future negotiations, it must be able to demon-
strate discipline and unity by keeping the rank and file in line.
A separate institutional interest of the union is a desire to
avoid whatever liability can attach if the union is found to have
breached its duty of fair representation. 25
How the union perceives its multiple interests will deter-
mine whether the union pursues a particular grievance on be-
22. For a discussion of the union's proper role in balancing the competing
interests of employees in the bargaining unit, see infra notes 130-45 and accom-
panying text.
23. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
24. Many grievance issues, such as discharges, have no effect on future ne-
gotiations. Promotion cases rarely change contract language, and most senior-
ity cases have no effect on future negotiations. Establishing precedent can be
important, but it is seldom involved in these types of cases. For a discussion of
the rationales justifying union discretion in making judgments that affect nego-
tiation, see infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
25. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided Bowen
v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983), which may alter the union's
incentives in favor of processing grievances to arbitration. In Bowe7, the Court
held that, in a wrongful discharge case, a union may be held liable for an entire
back pay award from the time the grievance would have been arbitrated until
the time of judgment. The magnitude of this new potential liability may induce
unions to arbitrate all discharge cases.
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half of the employee-grievant or chooses to dismiss the
grievance and accept, at least tacitly, the employer's position,
thus shielding the employer from further challenge by the em-
ployee-grievant.26 Ideally, the standard chosen for the duty of
fair representation should attempt to balance the legitimate in-
terests of the grievant against the legitimate interests of the
union. In many situations, when the interest of the grievant in
winning the grievance directly conflicts with interests of other
employees, the individual's interest should give way to the
greater interest of the majority of employees. Even when the
individual grievant's interest in the result must yield, however,
the majority has no legitimate interest in denying the grievant
fair process. In fact, the majority shares the grievant's interest
in the integrity of the grievance process. If the union's deci-
sionmaking process is perceived as fair, greater employee satis-
faction and, in turn, greater industrial peace will be promoted.
B. THE SOURCE AND PURPOSE OF THE DUTY OF FAno
REPRESENTATION
1. In General
The duty of fair representation is a judicially created con-
cept that extends to all instances in which the union represents
employees. 27 Because the content given to the duty depends
on what union behavior is considered desirable in the particu-
lar context and how the union's actions affect employees' inter-
ests, the union's duty of fair representation in contract
negotiation differs from the union's duty of fair representation
in enforcing the contract through grievance/arbitration
procedures. 28
26. Id.
27. Basically, the union represents employees in two different, but related,
contexts-contract negotiation and contract enforcement. The duty of fair rep-
resentation also extends to areas in which the union would not be obligated to
represent the employees, but has assumed the obligation. See, e.g., Nedd v.
United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977).
28. Contract formation and contract enforcement through grievance
processing are linked in many ways. The union has an interest in seeing that
the terms it negotiated are followed by the employer. Furthermore, issues of
employee interest relevant to negotiation of future contracts may surface first
in the grievance context. Despite this relation between negotiation and en-
forcement, the different procedures of union decisionmaking in grievance
processing and negotiation require a different balance of majority and minority
interests in the two types of activity. There has been general agreement among
scholars that unions should be accorded greater latitude and held to a less
stringent standard in contract negotiation than in contract enforcement. See
Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MIN. L. REV.
183 (1980); Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Be-
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The concept of the union's duty of fair representation
originated in a contract negotiation context in which the union
had exhibited racial bias against black members of its bargain-
ing unit. The Supreme Court held that, in exchange for relin-
quishing to the union the right to bargain individually with the
employer,29 the members of the bargaining unit had the right to
expect the union to represent them fairly and without discrimi-
nation.30 In other words, by obtaining the exclusive right to
bargain on behalf of the members of its bargaining unit, the
union assumed a corresponding duty to represent them fairly.
Because federal labor statutes subsume individuals and
minority groups within a union and prevent them from bargain-
ing separately with their employer, courts saw the need to im-
pose on unions a duty of fair representation to protect minority
groups, who, by virtue of either their numerical minority or
their political disenfranchisement, are unable to protect their
interests through the internal majoritarian processes of the
union.3 1 It can be assumed from the union's composition that
the union will be responsive to majority interests in most in-
stances.32 The primary purpose of the duty of fair representa-
tween Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. Iu.. L. F. 35; Rosen, Fair
Representation; Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Of-
ficials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.3. 391 (1964).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976) provides for the certification of a union as the ex-
clusive bargaining agent for employees in most private industry. The Railway
Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976) (RLA), covers certification of a union as the
exclusive bargaining agent for railway employees. Although the concept of the
duty of fair representation was first announced in a case under the RLA, the
language of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) (NLRA),
was patterned on the RLA and the courts' use of the concept of the duty of fair
representation in cases under these statutes has been virtually interchangea-
ble. For a full discussion comparing the development of the duty of fair repre-
sentation under the NLRA and the RLA, see Feller, supra note 17.
Although it is generally recognized that the duty derives from § 9(a) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976), and the comparable provisions of § 2 of the RLA,
the Supreme Court has often been unclear as to the exact source of the duty.
Professor Feller notes that in Vaca v. Sipes, as well as in other cases, the Court
has rested its jurisdiction in fair representation suits on § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1976), thereby treating the duty as derived from the collective bargaining
agreement rather than from the statute. Feller, supra note 17, at 807-08. This
confusion has also been noted by Professor Blumrosen in discussing Union
News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). Blurnrosen argues that the
court erroneously found that the duty of fair representation was grounded in
the collective bargaining agreement rather than in the statute. See Blumrosen,
The Worker, supra note 9, at 1492-93.
30. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
31. Id.
32. In certain circumstances, however, a union official may not be immedi-
ately responsive to the wishes of a numerical majority. See Co, The Legal Na-
ture of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1958). Even in
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tion is to make the union accountable to minority interests as
well.33 Since many union actions have the potential to affect
individuals or minority groups adversely, the standard for the
duty of fair representation must differentiate those areas in
which the majority may appropriately overpower a minority
from those in which it may not.3
2. Breach of Duty as a Precondition to Suit Against The
Employer
In Vaca v. Sipes, 3 5 the Supreme Court employed the ex-
isting concept of duty of fair representation to narrow the griev-
ant's access to a decision on the merits of his or her grievance.
The Supreme Court had previously held that a grievant must
exhaust available grievance/arbitration channels before resort-
ing to the courts.36 The Court had also held that the duty of
fair representation was applicable to the union's actions in
processing grievances. 37 In Vaca, the Supreme Court held that,
absent explicit language in the contract, the employee has no
right to have a grievance arbitrated, and that the employee can
sue his or her employer on the breach of contract claim only if
the employee first proves that the union breached its duty of
fair representation in failing to take the case to arbitration.
3 8
This two-part holding channels all attempts by employees to
enforce claims against the employer through the union. As a
these circumstances, however, the majority may exercise a check on the union
official by merely voting him out at the next union election or by the more se-
vere means of decertifying the union as the bargaining agent for the unit.
33. Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974)
('The objective of the duty of fair representation is to provide substantive and
procedural safeguards for minority members of the collective bargaining
unit.").
34. Much of the early literature in the area addressed itself to whether the
individual employee had an absolute right to benefits provided under the con-
tract or whether the union could waive individual contract rights in the interest
of the collective. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 9. This debate reflects
many of the classic arguments of individual versus collective rights. For in-
stance, although it is unfair to rob Peter to pay Paul, where the welfare or sur-
vival of the entire group hinges on some individual sacrifice, public policy
suggests the group should prevail. In situations between the two poles, the
best policy is less clear. See infra notes 130-56 and accompanying text.
35. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
36. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). This ruling
raised the much debated question whether the union could control access to
arbitration or the employee could compel arbitration. If the employee could
not compel arbitration, the question arose whether the employee could sue the
employer in court once all available grievance procedures had been exhausted.
See supra note 9.
37. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
38. 386 U.S. at 185-86.
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result, all suits by employees to resolve unarbitrated griev-
ances must focus initially on whether the union has breached
its duty of fair representation.
The Court's reasons for interposing this issue in employee
suits were based on the Court's analysis of the dynamics of the
grievance/arbitration system. The Court reasoned that grant-
ing individual employees the right to take claims to arbitration
would overburden the grievance/arbitration system and possi-
bly cause it to collapse. In addition, granting employees the
right to arbitrate would reduce employers' incentives to negoti-
ate with unions to settle claims prior to arbitration, thus under-
mining the authority of unions. Similarly, allowing an
employee to sue an employer on a breach of contract claim,
once grievance/arbitration procedures had been exhausted,
could undermine the position and authority of both the union
and the arbitrator and open a potential floodgate of litigation by
employees disaffected with decisions made by the process.
Therefore, the Court concluded that it was in the interest of
federal labor policy and its preference for arbitration to allow
unions to control the processing of grievances. By acquiring
this power to control grievance processing, however, a union
acquired a corresponding duty to represent a grievant fairly.39
Accordingly, when a union has breached its duty by failing to
represent a grievant fairly, the congressionally sanctioned pri-
vate method of grievance resolution has failed, and the grievant
may seek a determination of his or her contract claim against
the employer in court.
Thus, interposing the duty of fair representation as a
threshold issue to employee suits accommodates two conflict-
ing values: 1) the desire to protect the vitality and indepen-
dence of industrial self-government from undue judicial
interference, and 2) the desire to protect employees with meri-
torious grievances from abuses of power at the hands of the
union by providing them with some recourse to an unbiased
decisionmaker. Each of these values deserves closer
examination.
On the one hand, it is desirable to protect industrial self-
government from undue judicial interference for the reasons
mentioned by the Court. If the dispute resolution system is to
function effectively, only a limited number of grievances can be
arbitrated. Otherwise, the quality of arbitration would dimin-
ish, and the cost of arbitration would cause employers and un-
39. Id. at 193.
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ions to back away from this voluntary method of dispute
resolution. In addition, the primacy of arbitration should not
be undercut by employees rushing to another forum to resolve
their disputes. Limiting court review to those instances in
which a union has breached its duty of fair representation pre-
serves the finality of the prearbitration resolution of the
grievance.4o
There are two general reasons for preserving this finality.
First, a court trial may detrimentally affect the continuing rela-
tionship of the parties in an ongoing enterprise. Typically, an
employee-grievant will continue to be a member of the em-
ployer's work force and the union's bargaining unit. Court tri-
als tend to harden the respective sides, aligning the parties as
adversaries. Although in specific instances it may be worth-
while for the parties to endure this cost if a more just result is
reached, there is no assurance that a court will arrive at a bet-
ter result, especially since courts generally lack expertise in
dealing with issues of industrial policy. Second, collective bar-
gaining, as envisioned by Congress, is a system of private or-
dering.4 1 In formulating federal labor policy, Congress rejected
the notion that the government should establish contract terms
for labor and management in favor of a scheme of greater labor
andmanagement autonomy.42 The choice of contract terms is
left to the parties themselves. When a grievance is abandoned
40. The language of most collective bargaining agreements provides that
grievances that are not advanced to the next higher step within a specified time
period are considered finally barred. In an action under NLRA § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1976), a court will lift the "bar of finality" if the union has breached its
duty of fair representation. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
544 (1976) (holding that a breach of the union's duty of fair representation
would even set aside the presumably heavier "bar of finality" which attaches to
an arbitrator's decision).
41. The term "private ordering" is attributed to L HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS 292-93, 298-301 (10th ed. 1958). Professor Rosen sees this judi-
cial reluctance to intervene in labor relations as "a continuation of the general
judicial attitude against intervention in the sphere of private associational
power and organization." Rosen, supra note 28, at 401.
Professor Finkin observes:
A vexing problem results from the tension between the statutory sys-
tem of private ordering by majority rule, a system that precludes gov-
ernment from setting the terms of the collective agreement, and the
need to impose an external limit on the resulting bargain in order to
protect individuals and minorities from abuses of majority power. Tra-
ditionally, the most important limit has been found in the judicially
created duty of fair representation ....
Finkin, supra note 28, at 184.
42. In fashioning § 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1976), legis-
lators agreed that unions and employers should not be required to make a com-
pact. In the words of Senator Walsh, "[A]ll the bill proposes to do is escort
representatives to the bargaining door of their employer .... What happens
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before arbitration, the union has tacitly agreed to leave the em-
ployer's action unchallenged. To preserve the autonomy of the
contracting parties, a court must not substitute its judgment for
the judgment of the union and employer.
On the other hand, a sound labor policy should protect in-
dividual employees from bad faith or arbitrary union actions.
The collective bargaining structure should not enable a union
to use its power as a device for abusing the interests it is em-
powered to protect.43 By allowing an employee to sue an em-
ployer when the employee has demonstrated that the union
breached its duty of fair representation, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that the union does not have complete power to waive
the rights of individual employees and that an individual em-
ployee's contract rights are entitled to some degree of protec-
tion. In Vaca, the Court rhetorically questioned whether
"Congress, in conferring upon the employers and unions the
power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to
confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive in-
jured employees of all remedies for breach of contract."44 In
the absence of a grievance/arbitration mechanism, employees
are free to seek court enforcement of their breach of contract
claims.45 Similarly, in those situations where a griev-
ance/arbitration mechanism exists but the union does not con-
trol access to arbitration, employees are free to arbitrate their
claims.4 6 Thus, the collective bargaining agreement creates in
the employee substantive contract rights that would be en-
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire
into it." 79 CONG. REC. 7660 (1935).
The scheme chosen by Congress to provide for more peaceful labor rela-
tions and to equalize the balance of power between employers and employees
was to enable employees to unionize and to require employers to bargain with
the unions. See id.
43. The recognition of this right is a necessary product of a system of
collective rights operating within a larger legal, social and political con-
text which rightfully respects individual expectations. Constant him-
self saw collective liberty threatened by its own peculiar danger, "that
men might make individual rights too cheap." That the individual's
rights may be subsumed to the collective may be necessary; that those
rights, now held by the collective may be bartered away, is permitted;
but that such collective rights, rights mirroring justifiable individual ex-
pectations of individual members, should be frivolously abandoned, is
collective liberty degraded to a caricature of itself, to unprincipled
majoritianism or ochiocracy.
Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Employment Relation, 56 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1980) (footnote omitted).
44. 386 U.S. at 186.
45. Id. at 183.
46. See, e.g., Schum v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1974)
(contract gave either an employee or the union the right to invoke arbitration).
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forceable but for contract provisions limiting enforcement to ar-
bitration at the request of the union. Although these
competing values are implicated in every lawsuit of this type,
merely identifying these values does not provide a clear focus
for lower courts attempting to decide whether the duty of fair
representation has been breached in a specific situation.
C. THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD FOR UNION "ARBITRARiNESS"
Supreme Court decisions have provided little guidance to
unions on how they should discharge their duty, or to the lower
courts on how to determine whether a union has breached its
duty.47 Supreme Court references to the standard have been
characterized by catch phrases. The duty is violated by union
actions which are "in bad faith," "discriminatory," "perfunc-
tory," or "arbitrary."48 Conversely, union actions which are in
"good faith and with honesty of purpose in the exercise of [the
union's] discretion" fulfill the duty.49
Moreover, the scope of this judicially developed standard
has changed over time, influenced, in part, by the sequence in
which cases were decided. The earliest Supreme Court cases
involved employee allegations that the union breached its duty
by exhibiting animus toward the plaintiffs such as racial dis-
crimination or personal hostility.50 Gradually, this subjective
standard was augmented by the addition of an objective com-
ponent,51 which grew out of the Supreme Court's use of the
term "arbitrariness" to describe conduct which would violate
47. See supra note 10.
48. 386 U.S. at 190-91.
49. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
50. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)
(racial discrimination).
51. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967), and Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) have been
particularly significant in the development of the objective standard for the
duty of fair representation. In Humphrey, the Court decided that the union
was obligated "'to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all those
members... subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion."' 375 U.S. at 342 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. at 337-38 (emphasis added)). Again quoting Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338, the Humphrey Court stated that "[a] wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serv-
ing the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion." 375 U.S. at 349. This language, which
is frequently repeated in more recent Supreme Court opinions, indicates that
the union's discretion is circumscribed not only by the subjective limitations of
good faith and honesty of purpose, but circumscribed as well by the standard of
reasonableness-although the range of reasonableness is wide. In examining
the union action under attack in Humphrey, the Court concluded that "the
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the duty of fair representation. When cast in the disjunctive, in
such phrases as "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith,"52
the inclusion of the term "arbitrary" implies that some union
behavior could be found to breach the duty of fair representa-
tion without establishing the presence of animus toward the
grievant.53 Although "bad faith" and "discriminatory" union ac-
tions continue to provide a basis for a claim that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation, most Courts of Ap-
peals now follow the rule that a union can be found to have
breached its duty without any allegation of bad faith or wrong-
ful subjective motivation.5 4
union acted upon wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbi-
trary factors." Id. at 350.
There is some disagreement about whether the courts' review of unions'
contract negotiations should be merely procedural, see, e.g., Leffler, supra note
28, at 46-47, or whether courts should review the substance of unions' bargain-
ing positions as well, see, e.g., Finkin, supra note 28. Professor Finkin takes the
view that "the fair representation question must be determined by weighing
the firmness and significance of the minority's defeated expectations against
the degree of interference with the system of collective bargaining occasioned
by the substitution of an external judgment for that of the union." Id. at 210.
Professor Finkin proposes eight rules of thumb for determining breach of a
union's duty of fair representation in contract negotiation. See id. at 210-31.
52. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190.
53. Certainly evidence of unreasonableness or arbitrariness can give rise
to the inference that a union's action was motivated by bad faith. However,
there is an increasing willingness on the part of the courts to overturn a union
decision in those cases where bad faith is not alleged.
Discriminatory or bad faith conduct could also be considered "arbitrary."
But there is no suggestion that the definition of arbitrary conduct is to be lim-
ited to those cases which are similar to discriminatory or bad faith conduct by
the principle of ejusdem generis. The fact that the terms are stated in the dis-
junctive implies that arbitrariness alone is an allowable basis for finding a
union breached its duty of fair representation.
54. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressman's Union No.
2, 590 F.2d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1979); Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558, 560
(9th Cir. 1979); Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715
(10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Archie v. Chicago
Truck Drivers Union, 585 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 1978); Sanderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir. 1973); Griffin v. United Auto, Aerospace & Agricul-
tural Workers, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
Some commentators have read Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Mo-
tor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), as a return to a subjec-
tive standard. In that case the Supreme Court reiterated the "discriminatory or
bad faith" language of Vaca, see supra note 48, and stated "[tihere must be a
'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct"' in order
to find a breach of the duty of fair representation. 403 U.S. at 299 (quoting
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)). However, Lockridge is distin-
guishable in one very important respect-it was not a hybrid § 301 breach of
duty suit. The individual employee did not sue the union in order to prevail
against the employer on an underlying breach of contract claim. The Court ex-
pressly noted that the employee's suit against the union was not bottomed on a
collective bargaining agreement at all. 403 U.S. at 299. In Lockridge, the action
was basically a tort action for interference with employment relations. Thus, to
1983] 1097
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
What specific union conduct is deemed "arbitrary," how-
ever, varies widely and leads to the current confusion in the
state of the law. Apparent inconsistencies exist between cir-
cuits and within the same circuit.5 5 Scholars attempting to de-
fine the term "arbitrariness" have developed different
standards for the union's duty of fair representation in griev-
ance processing.56 Interpretations of what constitutes "arbi-
trary" behavior generally follow either the negligence standard
or the rational decisionmaking standard.57
1. The Negligence Standard
Proponents of the negligence standard reason that the
Supreme Court's use of the term "arbitrariness" prohibits cer-
tain types of union behavior beyond that which could be con-
the extent that the dicta in Lockridge can be said to require proof of wrongful
motivation to establish that a union has breached its duty of fair representa-
tion, it seems reasonable to infer that the scope of the duty of fair representa-
tion is different when the duty of fair representation is embedded in an action
on a contract claim than when it is not. See Baidini v. United Auto., Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers, 581 F.2d 145, 150 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978). But see
Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1981) (court required scienter,
although duty of fair representation issue was embedded in an action for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement).
55. Compare Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981) with
Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978); Baldini v. UAW,
581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir; 1978); and Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th
Cir. 1976). Compare also the differing opinions of the plurality, concurrence,
and dissent in Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
56. Professor Finken has noted that a court's inquiry into union "arbitrari-
ness" should be less intense in the contract negotiation context. See Finkin,
supra note 28, at 197.
57. A third approach exists as well. Some commentators have approached
the problem from the view that certain interests are so important to the griev-
ant that the union should be required to arbitrate all such claims. See Blum-
rosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interest7 Union-Management Authority
Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. RE V. 631, 656-57 (1959); Tobias, A
Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U.
CiN. L. REv. 55, 89 (1972). Under Tobias's view, the union should be required to
arbitrate all discharge cases because discharge is the industrial equivalent of
capital punishment. See id. at 57-58. At the other end of the spectrum, the
union makes an evaluation of the importance of the grievance when it appropri-
ately refuses to process a frivolous grievance. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (grievant was suspended because he re-
fused to wear a tie at work as required by dress code). Although there is some
evidence to suggest that both courts and the National Labor Relations Board
hold a union to a higher standard of duty in cases in which the employee's in-
terest is more important, see Note, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the
Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HAsTnGs L.J. 1041, 1063 (1981), this type of
analysis has not been fruitful in yielding a uniform, predictable standard for
the duty of fair representation in cases in which the grievant's interest is more
than frivolous but less substantial than the loss of his or her job.
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sidered intentionally tortious. 58 These commentators argue
that a union's careless execution of its representation function
can be just as injurious to a grievant as conduct motivated by
animus. Furthermore, negligent union behavior advances no
collective interest. Thus, they conclude that a union should be
held to have breached its duty of fair representation if it has ac-
ted negligently in processing a grievance.
59
In application, the negligence standard has been directed
at union care in complying with grievance procedures, rather
than at union care in making substantive, informed judgments.
Consequently, the standard focuses on technicalities in griev-
ance processing, such as a union's failure to meet a contractual
time deadline for appeal, misnumbering a document, or losing
a grievant's fe. 60 The inquiry turns on whether the specific
omission alleged constitutes the requisite degree of fault.
6 1
Because the negligence standard focuses on the technicali-
58. See Dinges, Ruzicka v. General Motors: An Unlikely Hero of the Trade
Union Movement-The Individual Employee in a Section 301 Case Who Has
Been a Victim of Union Negligence, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1773, 1782 (1978). See
also Note, Determining Standards For a Union's Duty of Fair Representation.
The Case For Ordinary Negligence, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 634, 651 (1980).
59. See generally authorities cited supra note 58. Support for this position
is found in the Supreme Court's language: "[W]e accept the proposition that a
union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a per-
functory fashion." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
60. See, e.g, Baker v. Unit Parts Co., 487 F. Supp. 1313 (W.D. Okla. 1980)
(summary judgment denied the union on the fair representation issue where
the union agreed to process the claim and then did nothing); Ruggirello v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (union's failure to file a grievance
after it acknowledged claim's merit constitutes negligent breach of duty); Sis-
son v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 92 L.IRRM. (BNA) 3673 (D. Kan. 1976) (fail-
ure of union official to appear at arbitration hearing raised issue of unfair
representation); Local 692, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 209 N.L.IB. 446 (1974) (un-
timely filing and processing of meritorious grievance). But see Patterson v. Bi-
alystoker & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 95 LR.R.M. (BNA) 3115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(negligence in union's failure to file timely does not amount to a breach when
union determined that the claim was meritless).
61. Several commentators have discussed the propriety of using ordinary
negligence as the standard of assessing breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion. Some argue that an ordinary negligence standard would impose undue
financial hardship on smaller unions and allow courts to interfere to an unac-
ceptable degree in the grievance/arbitration system. See Adomeit, Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step In the Seemingly Inexorable March To-
ward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) Into Labor Arbitrators of Last
Resor4 9 CoNN. L. REV. 627, 634-35 (1977). Others argue that "there appears to
be no valid reason to leave employees, damaged because of union negligence in
the handling of their grievances, without redress." Flynn & Higgins, Fair Repre-
sentation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change
in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SursoLx U.L. REV. 1096, 1147 (1974). See
also Note, supra note 58, at 649-51 (concluding that the NLRB should adopt an
ordinary negligence standard in order to prevent unions from shielding em-
ployers from liability, to protect employee interests in the essentially fiduciary
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ties of compliance with grievance procedures, an employee has
no recourse if the union has correctly followed procedure. Fur-
thermore, since the standard does not require the union to
make a substantive decision about the grievance, an employee
has no recourse even if the union without reason failed to ad-
vance the grievance. 62 By imposing sanctions only for proce-
dural mistakes, the negligence standard has the advantage of
preventing a court from substituting its judgment for the
union's decision not to process a grievance,6 3 but this can be at
the expense of the individual grievant if the union acted unrea-
sonably in terminating the grievance. Since the range of con-
duct this standard encompasses is limited, the standard fails to
address the more difficult questions of how a union should bal-
ance conflicting individual and collective interests or choose be-
tween rival grievants. By avoiding these questions, the
negligence standard fails to remedy possible abuses of the mi-
nority at the hands of the majority-one of the Court's primary
purposes in creating the duty of fair representation.6 4
2. The Rational Decisionmaking Standard
The second standard for breach of the union's duty of fair
representation in grievance processing is the rational decision-
making standard.65 Under this theory, "arbitrariness" is
equated with the absence of rational decisionmaking, rather
relationship between unions and employers, and to ameliorate conflicts of in-
terest between groups of employees).
Some commentators argue that union negligence should constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation only when the union has negligently
failed to follow the correct procedure for handling grievances. See Note, Can
Negligent Representation Be Fair Representation? An Alternative Approach to
Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 537, 556-57 (1980); Note,
LB.E.W. v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duty of Fair Representation, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1066-69 (1981). But see Dinges, supra note 58, at 1784 (con-
cluding that union negligence in failing to follow correct grievance procedure
when union has not made a determination of the merits of the grievance should
be treated as a per se violation of the duty of fair representation). For discus-
sion of circuit courts' rulings on negligence issues, see Morgan, Fair is Foul
and Foul is Fair-Ruzicka and the Duty of Fair Representation in the Circuit
Courts, 11 U. Tor. L. REV. 335 (1980).
62. Although acting or failing to act without reason could be considered
"unreasonable" or "negligent" behavior, proponents of the negligence standard
have refused to extend the standard to a union's cognitive behavior. See au-
thorities cited supra note 61. The Sixth Circuit has begun to blur the distinc-
tion between the negligence standard and the rational decisionmaking
standard in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. See supra note 11 and infra notes
116-17 and accompanying text.
63. See generally supra text accompanying notes 27-46.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
65. For a full discussion of this theory see Clark, supra note 13; Leffler,
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than with negligent failure to comply with grievance proce-
dures. This standard requires that a union have some rational
justification for terminating a grievance. 66 Since a failure to fol-
low the appeals process correctly can terminate a grievance on
a basis other than by a reasoned union decision to terminate,
the rational decisionmaking standard encompasses those union
actions proscribed by the negligence standard as well.
67
Although the rational decisionmaking standard attempts to
go beyond the negligence standard to remedy some union
abuses not accompanied by procedural error, the rational deci-
sionmaking standard is at once too broad and too narrow. It is
too broad because, as articulated to date, the rational decision-
making standard offers few guidelines for determining what de-
cisions are rational. Rational decisionmaking entails an open-
ended balancing test, weighing multiple factors on a case by
case basis.68 Without clearer guidelines there is a risk that a
supra note 28. Summers, supra note 13 can be considered in line with the ra-
tional decisionmaking theory in its interpretation of Supreme Court case law.
Commentator Fredric Leffler maintains that under Vaca; judicial inquiry
into the union's duty of fair representation is two pronged: 1) a subjective anal-
ysis of the union's conduct, focusing on any evidence of discrimination, per-
sonal hostility, or bad faith, and 2) an objective evaluation of the union's
conduct to detect arbitrary decisionmaking or perfunctory processing of a
grievance. Leffler, supra note 28, at 43. The second prong of Leffler's test,
which corresponds to the subject of this Article, follows the rational decision-
making theory. Leffler, supra note 28, at 46.
Cases that follow the rational decisionmaking theory include Robesky v.
Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978); Beriault v. Local 40,
Super Cargoes & Checkers of Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.
1974).
66. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 194.
67. Both theories find support in the same three cases. See Foust v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Minnis v. United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Ruzicka v. General Motors
Corp., 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975). For differing interpretations of these three
cases, compare the views of the majority and the dissent in Smith v. Hussmann
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980). See also infra text accompanying
notes 157-70.
68. Commentator Fredric Leffler observes that a union should be required
to consider the merits of the grievance in deciding whether to arbitrate a claim.
He maintains that "[t] he union may avoid liability successfully if it can estab-
lish that its institutional interests in settling the grievance substantially out-
weighted [sic] the claim's degree of merit." Leffler, supra note 28, at 54.
However, Leffler fails to examine which "institutional interests" are legitimate
and how the merits of grievance claims should be determined. He maintains
that "when a court determines the nature and merits of a particular claim sub-
stantially outweigh the union's institutional interest, the cost of arbitration is
justified, and the union should be held to have violated its duty if it settled the
claim short of arbitration." Id. at 55. Except for wrongful discharge claims,
which, he argues, should always be arbitrated, few guidelines are afforded for
how the court should assign relative weights to the balance and how the
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court may substitute its judgment for the judgment of a
union.69 The rational decisionmaking standard is too narrow
because it fails to ensure protection of vested minority inter-
ests. Under this standard, a union action that redistributed rec-
ognized contract benefits from a minority to a majority could be
minimally rational,7 0 even though the action would not be fair.
Thus, neither the negligence standard nor the rational deci-
sionmaking standard, as articulated to date, addresses the im-
portant questions of when collective interests appropriately
outweigh an individual grievant's interest, and what sort of
court review will best delimit court inquiry. In addition,
neither standard provides an affirmative formulation of how a
union should discharge its duty of fair representation to a
grievant. The negligence standard provides no affirmative for-
mulation at all, and the rational decisionmaking standard
merely makes the broad charge that union decisions be
rational.
I. THE FAIR PROCESS STANDARD: A MODEL FOR
UNION CONDUCT
A. REQUIRING THE UNION To CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE
GRIEVANCE
In its simplest form, this Article's proposal is that, in the
context of grievance processing, fair representation means the
union should be required to take the merits of the grievance
into consideration, before acting in any way that forecloses ar-
bitration of the grievance, whenever the union is vested with
the exclusive authority to invoke the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the union should be expected to make a good faith
assessment of the merits of a grievance and attempt to distin-
guish meritorious grievances from nonmeritorious grievances.7 1
rebalancing comports with the underlying policy of judicial deference to the
private ordering of the collective parties.
69. To avoid this problem in extreme circumstances, proponents of the ra-
tional decisionmaking standard have recognized that a court should ask
whether a rational union could have decided to proceed as it did, rather than
whether the union decision was the best decision which could have been made.
70. For treatment of this problem under the proposed standard, see infra
notes 134-70 and accompanying text.
71. Some scholars have questioned whether it is possible to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement definitively or whether the agreement is neces-
sarily subject to multiple interpretations. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 9, at 23.
Meritorious and nonmeritorious grievances are polar ends of a spectrum.
Whether a grievance will be found meritorious is an issue in the realm of
probability or likelihood. The issue, however, is not purely one of chance. For
purposes of this Article, a "meritorious" grievance can be defined as one that
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By considering the merits of the grievance the union can sat-
isfy the grievant's legitimate interest in the fairness of the pro-
cess, 7 2 if not his or her interest in the subject of the claim.
Thus, under the proposed standard the grievant would receive
fair process-a decision on the merits. Although technically, a
grievance is not deemed meritorious until an arbitrator deter-
mines that it is, the fiction is useful in developing a standard
for union conduct.73 The union can best appraise whether an
arbitrator would find a grievance meritorious by engaging in
the same type of decisionmaking process one would expect the
arbitrator to follow. Thus, union decisionmaking should be
modeled on the arbitration process itself.
To establish a claim in arbitration, the grievant must prove
that the employer breached a particular clause of the contract
in a particular circumstance resulting in injury to the grievant.
The grievant must 1) prove the truth of certain facts about the
incident and 2) persuade the decisionmaker that the contract
interpretation which will yield the result the grievant seeks is
the "correct" interpretation-the interpretation intended by the
parties when they agreed to the language. A further inquiry
subsumed in contract interpretation is whether the contract
language relied upon by the grievant applies to the situation at
all. The situation may be governed by some other contract lan-
guage or the contract may be silent on the matter. Sometimes
the "law" on which a grievant bases his or her claim is an es-
tablished pattern, practice, or custom that the grievant claims
has implicitly become a part of the contract. 74
yields a significant benefit to the grievant and is based on a reasonable con-
struction of clear contract language as applied to facts believed to be true.
72. For a discussion of the employee's interest in the fairness of the pro-
cess, see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
73. As a matter of jurisprudence, the law does not ascribe merit to any le-
gal claim or cause of action until its merit has been determined by a court of
law. In some situations, however, there may be legal recognition of the merits
of a claim without a legal determination of its validity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1979). In the industrial context, it is the arbitra-
tor who determines whether the grievance is meritorious in claiming the con-
tract has been breached. When the process of evaluating the merits of a claim
has not reached culmination, there is the possibility that the contract has been
violated but the grievant's injury left unremedied.
74. [I]t is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-bargaining agreement
is simply a document by which the union and employees have imposed
upon management limited, express restrictions of its otherwise abso-
lute right to manage the enterprise, so that an employee's claim must
fail unless he can point to a specific contract provision upon which the
claim is founded. There are too many people, too many problems, too
many unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract
the exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce all the
rules governing a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or even
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Thus, under the proposed standard, the union's legal duty
is to evaluate the merits of the grievance by determining both
the facts 75 and the applicable law. To render a factual finding,
the union should gather the relevant evidence. Gathering evi-
dence entails questioning witnesses and sometimes, when sto-
ries conflict, evaluating the credibility of witnesses. The union
should further decide whether the grievance is meritorious
under the applicable contract language, as supplemented by es-
tablished practice. To make this judgment, the union must lis-
ten to the grievant's argument, read the language of the
contract, and consider existing custom and practice. To apply
this contract language to the situation, the union must deter-
mine the scope and purpose of the contract language.76
Like the other standards, the standard developed here is
derived from an attempt to reconcile the legitimate interests of
the grievant with the legitimate interests of the union and the
other employees it represents. Unlike the other standards, this
fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional
characteristics and the governmental nature of the collective-bargain-
ing process demand a common law of the shop which implements and
furnishes the context of the agreement. We must assume that intelli-
gent negotiators acknowledged so plain a need unless they stated a
contrary rule in plain words.
Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAZv. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959)
(quoted in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-80
(1960)). See also Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 111-12 (5th Cir.
1973) (written management policy not included in collective bargaining agree-
ment but agreed to by union held to be part of the collective bargaining
agreement).
75. For example, grievances based on discharge are more apt to be deter-
mined by the resolution of questions of fact. Did the employee-grievant assault
the foreman? See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976)
(discharged employee-grievant allegedly falsified motel receipts). In some dis-
charge cases, however, the employee-grievant may not challenge whether he or
she in fact did the act which was the basis for the discharge, but instead may
seek a determination whether, as a question of contract interpretation, it con-
stitutes 'Just cause" under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). The
grievant in Ruzicka did not dispute the essential facts that he came to work in-
toxicated and used threatening and abusive language toward his supervisors.
The thrust of the grievant's argument was that discharge was an "unduly
harsh" penalty which was inconsistent with past arbitration decisions inter-
preting the collective bargaining agreement. For a particularly unusual griev-
ance argument, see Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir.
1977). The grievant in Lowe admitted that without provocation he attacked his
supervisor but argued that that was not a basis for discharge because knifings,
shootings, and baseball bat beatings were not uncommon on the premises.
76. This necessarily entails considering the parties' intention in adopting
the language. Where the contract language is ambiguous, the union has a spe-
cial role to play. The union can give content to vague or ambiguous contract
language by determining questions of industrial policy, ultimately deciding
what policy is best for the plant and for the employees the union represents.
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standard is fashioned on a due process model of union behav-
ior.77 This standard, unlike the others, recognizes that individ-
ual grievants have an interest in the fairness of the process, an
interest which is distinct from their interest in the result and
which does not necessarily conflict with the group's interest.
The essential function served by the fair representation duty in
the grievance processing context is to recognize that certain
minimal process is due the grievant.78 Since the issue of what
minimal process the grievant is due is a question of what is
fair, the proposed standard will be referred to herein as a fair
process model.79 Like due process, the fair process model is
basically procedural but also has some substantive elements.
A union's determination under the fair process model can
be likened to the determinations of those administrative agen-
cies which perform both investigative and adjudicative func-
tions.80 Like such an agency, a union should be required to
77. It is recognized that modeling union behavior on due process consider-
ations marks a departure from, and conflicts with, the historical behavior of un-
ions in exercising leverage on the employer based on majority sentiment. This
historical pattern of union behavior, though perhaps still suitable in contract
negotiation, is inappropriate in contract enforcement. Although the due pro-
cess model is inconsistent with the historical origins of the duty of fair repre-
sentation, the model appears to be consistent with recent trends in court
decisions. For a discussion of how the proposed standard compares to the his-
torical view, see infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. The proposed stan-
dard is conceptually very different than the analogies frequently made,
modeling union behavior on the role of a fiduciary, see Finkin, supra note 28, or
on the role of an advocate for the grievant. Modeling union behavior on the
role of the arbitrator or an administrative agency is more appropriate because
it recognizes that the union can take into account interests other than the
grievant's in deciding whether to invoke arbitration. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 78-79.
A disclaimer should be made at this point. In arguing that the union's duty
of fair representation to the employee-grievant should be modeled on due pro-
cess, no attempt is made to argue that this standard is constitutionally re-
quired. This Article merely takes the position that such a standard is desirable.
One commentator, however, has taken the position that due process is constitu-
tionally mandated. For an interesting discussion of a constitutional analysis of
employee rights under the federally structured collective bargaining relation-
ship, see Symposium Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government--A
"State Action" Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 4 (1968).
78. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
79. The author wishes to thank Professor Richard Lempert for suggesting
this term.
80. A union's role can be analogized to that of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC, created by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), investigates the facts of a claim,
evaluates the claim, and issues a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable
cause before deciding whether to take the claim to court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1976). In the industrial context, it is even more important that the union en-
gage in this type of deliberative investigation and evaluation of the claim than
it is that the EEOC do so, because a cqmplainant under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act may later pursue the claim in court, whereas a union's deter-
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investigate the facts of the grievance and evaluate the argu-
ments concerning whether the contract has been breached.
Also like such an agency, a union can sometimes use its exper-
tise to formulate additional policy rules in the context of the
grievance determination. As an administrative tribunal is
bound by the substantive provisions of its statute, the union's
discretion in processing grievances should be bound by the
substantive framework of the contract.81
The analogy between administrative procedure and union
processing of employee grievances is not perfect. The union is
a constituency whose existence depends entirely on the com-
posite members of its bargaining unit. An administrative
agency, on the other hand, is institutionally separate from
those individuals whose claims it considers, and the agency is
created externally by statute, not from the affected group itself.
This distinction has tremendous importance for the institu-
tion's identification with the claimants and for the number of
resources the institution can devote to investigating and pursu-
ing claims. The analogy need not be complete in all respects,
however, in order to enlighten and to inform the meaning of in-
stitutional fairness. The accumulated wisdom of what consti-
tutes arbitrary conduct by administrative agencies can serve as
an accessible analogy for courts unschooled in labor relations.
Although the debate over due process in administrative law
has devolved into a question of constitutional requirements
and the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,8
2 it
is the prudential considerations of administrative law that are
most enlightening to the debate over the union's duty of fair
ruination is likely to be final and binding, foreclosing later court suit by the
grievant. For an administrative agency counterpart, when the administrative
agency provides the exclusive right to redress a claim, see Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), in which the Court held that the agency's
failure timely to convene a fact finding conference, which deprived complainant
of a right to redress without opportunity to have the merits of the charge con-
sidered, violated due process.
81. It is this character of the grievance process which distinguishes it from
contract negotiation. Contract negotiation is akin to legislation, while grievance
handling is akin to administrative adjudication. A legislature has wide freedom
in designing substantive rules and may leave them in general terms, but an ad-
ministrative agency must limit its actions to the boundaries laid out by the leg-
islation. A union must perform both functions, but these functions are
exercised separately and should be subject to separate constraints. See articles
cited supra note 28.
82. See, e.g., L. TamE, AiEmCAN CONsTrUoNAL LAw 535 (1978); Grey, Pro-
cedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DuE PROCESS NoMos XVIII 197
(1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and Property, 62 CoRNELL L, REV. 405, 437-43
(1977); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Process
in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 463-64 (1977).
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representation in grievance processing. Thus, the focus of the
analogy is not on what administrative law is and how to
reproduce it exactly in the grievance context, but instead on
how principles of administrative jurisprudence can shed light
on the special relationship between a union and the members
of its bargaining unit and on the union's duty in administering
a collective bargaining agreement.
The analogy succeeds to the extent that union discretion
and agency discretion are based on similar principles. In both
settings, judicial checks on institutional action involve defer-
ence to institutional expertise, consideration of minority and
majority interests, regularization of the treatment of affected
individuals, and a concern for the institutional costs of provid-
ing individuals fair treatment. The principles underlying defer-
ence create, first, an exhaustion doctrine and, second, a judicial
unwillingness to set aside institutional decisions merely to sub-
stitute the court's judgment for the institution's expert judg-
ment. In each case, a court will review the merits of the
institution's decision only when the court has reason to believe
either that the decision was tainted with wrongful subjective
intent or that the decision was arbitrary.
In order to be practicable, the fair process model of the
duty of fair representation, like any due process standard, must
take into account the exigencies of the setting. The process
due the employee-grievant need not be nearly as formal or rig-
orous as would be found in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ing. Since a union may be required to deal with numerous
grievances in the course of a year, the standard for decision-
making should not have an unduly burdensome cumulative ef-
fect. The decision whether to arbitrate a grievance is typically
made by a union official popularly elected by union members,
an individual not likely to be trained in law. The proposed
standard can meet the requirements of this setting since it is
consistent with common sense and comports with fundamental,
universally held notions of fairness.
8 3
83. There is no reason to set the standard artificially low out of the patron-
izing belief that union stewards are incapable of providing better representa-
tion. But see Denver Stereotypers & Electrotypers Union Local 13 v. NLRB, 623
F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1980). For contrasting views of union attorneys on the issue,
compare Lipsitz, The Implications of Hines v. Anchor Motor Freigh in THE
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 55 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977), with Vladeck, The
Conflict between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Limitations on Union
Self-Governmen4 in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 44 (J. McKelvey ed.
1977). Unions can and do upgrade the quality of the grievance representation
their officials provide. One means of improving the quality of representation is
by offering training programs for union stewards.
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B. THE FAIR PROCESS STANDARD FROM A COURT'S VIEWPOINT:
A SCHEME FOR CLASSIFYING CASES
By framing the issue in terms of whether the union fully
considered the merits of the grievance, the wide variety of situ-
ations that unions, initially, and courts, in reviewing union con-
duct, are likely to encounter can be classified. A major
advantage of this classification is that it allows an examination
of the alignment of individual and collective rights in several,
quite different contexts. The classification will also allow con-
sideration of the second question: when is judicial sanction ap-
propriate? That question will be addressed as each separate
category is examined. In general, under the proposed standard,
the court's role in reviewing a union's decision on the merits
will parallel the court's role in reviewing a discretionary deci-
sion of an expert administrative agency.8 4
If the key question is whether a union accorded a grievant
fair process by considering the merits of the grievance, a re-
viewing court may encounter several possible situations. First,
the union may have failed to consider the merits at all. This
may have occurred in one of two ways: the union may have
made a careless mistake in processing the claim, resulting in
its premature termination, or the union may have failed to in-
vestigate fully the underlying factual situation. In either case,
the termination is not based on an appraisal of the claim's mer-
its. This union conduct would be improper under the proposed
standard and would allow a court to reach the merits of the
grievance because, since the union failed to consider the mer-
its, the grievant has not received fair process.85
Second, the union may have considered the claim's merits
but found the claim to be nonmeritorious because it was un-
supported either by the facts or by the contract language. This
finding provides a justifiable reason for terminating the claim.
84. Section 5(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1976), provides, 'The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . ." The sim-
ilarity between the union's duty of fair representation and the standard of judi-
cial review of agency action is noted in Feller, supra note 17, at 811-12.
85. Once the court finds the grievant has not received fair process, the
court could order arbitration of the contract claims. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
at 196. This is analogous to a court's decision to remand an issue to the admin-
istrative agency for further deliberation. See, e.g., Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A court may
be cautious to order arbitration, however, where it has reason to believe that




The reviewing court should therefore allow the union action to
stand; since the union has accorded the grievant fair process,
there is no need to probe the decision further.
86
The situation is similar when the union determines that
the grievance is frivolous.87 Consistent with a due process the-
ory, even where there is a technical breach of the contract, if
the interest at stake is de minimus, the individual is not enti-
tled to substantial due process because the individual's injury
and the minimal interest in remedying it do not justify the
costs of the process. Thus, the union should be able to weed
out frivolous claims that present no claim of serious injury to
the individual and serve only to burden the system.
Third, where the union has considered the merits of the
claim and found it to be at least arguably meritorious, the in-
quiry will be more complex. In this case, the court must deter-
mine whether the grievance involves predominantly an issue of
fact or of contract interpretation, because fact finding and con-
tract interpretation are fundamentally different types of deci-
sionmaking, involving different alignments of individual and
collective interests and different reasons for union discretion.
Generally, fact questions do not present issues of conflicting
employee interests. The focus of the union inquiry should be
on ascertaining the true facts. Therefore, the focus of court re-
view should be on the reliability of union fact finding. When
the grievance's merits depend on contract interpretation, there
are more likely to be conflicts of employee interests over differ-
ing interpretations. The union may have decided not to press
the claim because of the contrary interests of other members of
the bargaining unit. This situation can be ascertained easily
from the nature of the grievance itself. If other employees' in-
terests are at stake, the issue is whether the majority has taken
undue advantage of the minority.
If, however, the grievance does not implicate contrary in-
terests of other employees, the inquiry is not at an end. The
86. The union's judgments in determining claims to be nonmeritorious are
still constrained by the requirement that the union exercise good faith in its
determination, however. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
87. A union need not process a frivolous claim to arbitration. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1977). To guard against gross error in the union's cost-benefit evaluation of
the claim, it may be wise to allow the willing employee-grievant to bear the cost
of arbitration. The problem with using cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether to arbitrate is that in many situations, the union may not find the
claim to be sufficiently important to the group; however, the claim may be very




union may have been motivated to abandon the grievance for
reasons unrelated to the grievance's merits. The union may
have decided that the costs of arbitration to the union in terms
of money, time, effort, or leverage were not worth the benefits
of winning the grievance.
Thus, for the sake of analysis, three categories of cases can
be isolated: cases involving grievances whose merits depend
on 1) issues of fact; 2) contract interpretation when contrary in-
terests of other employees are directly implicated in the griev-
ance outcome; or 3) contract interpretation when the interests
of other employees are not directly implicated. These catego-
ries are chosen because they present different alignments of in-
dividual and collective interests in either the grievance result
or in the grievance/arbitration process. This classification
scheme provides a basis for analyzing the underlying policies
that determine the appropriate union response and the extent
to which court attachment of liability is effective in producing
that response. Although many cases involve combinations of
these factors, by isolating these components and ordering them
by degree of complexity, courts can analyze cases involving
multiple issues more systematically.
III. SPECIFICATION OF THE FAIR PROCESS MODEL
A. UNION FACT DETERMINATION IN ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A
GRIEVANCE
The merits of many grievances depend on issues of fact;
this is particularly true of grievances appealing disciplinary
penalties such as discharge. Vaca v. Sipes88 illustrates this sit-
uation and the role a union should play in making fact determi-
nations. In Vaca, the employee, Owens, was discharged on the
ground that he was unable to work because of poor health. The
grievance presented primarily a question of fact: whether
Owens was physically capable of performing his job. In re-
sponse to Owens' grievance, the union sent Owens to several
doctors to determine his physical fitness. Based on the doctors'
determinations that Owens was not fit to perform his job,89 the
union decided not to arbitrate the grievance. In the subse-
quent court action, the jury found for the plaintiff-employee,
awarding him damages against the union. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court could properly consider the issue of
88. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
89. Id. at 175.
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breach of duty of fair representation,90 but that, in this case,
the union did not breach its duty.
As we have stated, Owens could not have established a breach of that
duty merely by convincing the jury that he was in fact fit for work in
1960; he must also have proved arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the
part of the Union in processing his grievance. 9 1
The Court concluded that the union, having made the determi-
nation based on medical evidence, had fulfilled its duty,
notwithstanding that a jury later found Owens had been fit for
work.
This conclusion is in keeping with two sound principles of
jurisprudence. First, the stability of any decisionmaking sys-
tem depends on restricting the ability of appellate tribunals to
overturn factual determinations that are within the range of
reason. Reasonable juries presented with the same evidence
may not make identical fact findings. Unlike fact finding in sci-
entific inquiry, fact finding in adjudication is not always repro-
ducible. Thus, the ability to overturn those determinations
made by the original fact finder is limited in order to preserve
the stability of the system and to prevent appeals based on the
hope that the facts may be found differently by a different deci-
sionmaker.92 Appellate courts may overturn the findings of trial
courts only when those findings are clearly erroneous. Simi-
larly, trial courts or juries should overturn unions' fact determi-
nations only when those determinations are not supported by
the evidence the union collected after reasonable efforts.93
The second principle recognizes that the union must decide
whether to arbitrate within a relatively short time period and
on the basis of the facts available at the time.94 The parties in
the ongoing enterprise need the stability of definite answers
within a reasonable period of time. At a later date when the
union decision is challenged in court, more or different evi-
dence may be available, and with the benefit of hindsight, a
jury may find the facts differently. Thus, it is unrealistic and
impractical to hold a union to a standard of prescience. Within
the limits of the contractual time period for processing the
90. The Court considered and rejected the argument that the National La-
bor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction in these situations. Id. at 179.
91. Id. at 193.
92. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 660.
93. The other circumstance that justifies overturning a union's fact deter-
nmination is when a union's judgment has been tainted by bad faith or discrimi-
nation. Since this Article is concerned primarily with the union's objective
duty of fair representation, no attempt is made to discuss the union's subjec-
tive duty to refrain from discrimination or bad faith.
94. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, BAsIc PATTERNs IN UNION CON-
TRACTS 32 (8th ed. 1975).
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claim through the prearbitration stages, however, the union
should be required to gather all evidence then available.
Consistent with the union's conduct in the principal case, a
union can fulfill its duty under the proposed standard by deter-
mining the relevant facts in order to decide whether the griev-
ance is meritorious.95 If the union finds that the facts do not
support the claim, the employee receives all he or she has a
right to expect, a determination based on the merits of the
grievance.
Furthermore, since the goal to be advanced is that of
greater employee satisfaction with the fairness of the process,
it is desirable that the union inform the grievant of its appraisal
of the grievance's merits, particularly if it decides that the facts
do not support the grievant's claims.9 6 Many cases allege union
bad faith because the union failed to notify the employee of its
decision to terminate a nonmeritorious claim.9 7 Some courts
have gone so far as to hold that failing to tell employees that
their claims have been abandoned, or allowing employees to
continue to believe the union is still representing them in the
grievance process, constitutes a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation.98 Although union officials may be under-
standably hesitant to tell an employee that the evidence does
not support his or her claim, especially if the employee's own
95. Several courts have held that a union fulfills its duty to the employee
by determining that the relevant facts do not support the grievance claim. See
Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Crosby
Typesetting Co., 568 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. General Drivers, Local
Union No. 89, 488 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1973); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429
F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970).
96. Encouraging the union to disclose to the grievant its appraisal of the
merits of the employee's claim is desirable when the union determines that the
contract language does not support the grievant's claim as well as when the
union determines that the facts do not support the claim.
97. See, e.g., Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d
1082 (9th Cir. 1978) (although union obtained settlement of employee's griev-
ance, union failed to inform employee that she no longer had a chance to take
her grievance to arbitration to attempt to obtain a better settlement); Baldini v.
Local Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); Whitten v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976); Min-
nis v. International United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868
(3d Cir. 1970); Perry v. Chrysler Corp., 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,685 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (allegation of bad faith when plaintiff not notified of withdrawal of griev-
ance for four months).
98. See cases cited supra note 97. See also Baker v. Unit Parts Co., 487 F.
Supp. 1313 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (union's failure to take action and failure to in-
form raised an issue of unfair representation). But see Curry v. Chrysler Corp.,
95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2356 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (failure to inform grievant of with-
drawal of grievance not a breach).
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credibility is at stake, the union runs no risk of liability by do-
ing so, and any subsequent suit filed by a disgruntled employee
against the union can be dismissed without a trial.
1. The Duty to Investigate
In order to make an informed decision about the facts, a
union must fully investigate a clain. A complete investigation
entails gathering all the available evidence that would be nec-
essary to present the case to an arbitrator. The union should
collect whatever documentary evidence exists,99 question wit-
nesses to the event,100 and, where relevant, seek expert opin-
ion.101 Since the primary objective is fact finding, when
additional evidence is relevant, a union should not be satisfied
by merely talking to the employer and employee to seek adjust-
ment of the grievance.102 This requirement of full investigation
need not excessively burden the union. Since in many situa-
tions the grievant has access to the relevant evidence, the
99. E.g., the motel receipts in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
554, 556 (1976). But see Siskey v. Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(union's failure to uncover medical records did not constitute a breach when
the records did not support plaintiff's claim and when similar evidence had
been adduced); Howerton v. J. Christenson Co., 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,569
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (no breach when union relied on plaintiff's own calculations in
a back pay settlement rather than obtaining company payroll records).
100. See Anderson v. Grocers Supply Co., 483 F. Supp. 73, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(substantial issue of unfair representation raised when union refused to call
certain witnesses and to question other witnesses during grievance procedure).
Cf. Jozaitis v. F.W. Woolworth, Inc., No. 78C3319 (N.D. 1l. Mar. 13, 1980) (failure
to question witness held harmless error when testimony would not have added
to the facts). But see Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 85 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,081 (W.D.
Mich. 1978) (failure to investigate the existence of witness must reach the level
of gross negligence before a breach will be found); Warb v. General Motors
Corp., 95 L.R.M. (BNA) 3238, 3238-39 (ED. Mich. 1977) (no breach when union
made good faith attempt to question witness but failed because of company in-
transigence). Professor Rabin suggests that failure to interview witnesses or to
pursue obvious lines of inquiry are omissions egregious enough even to set
aside the bar of finality which accompanies an arbitration proceeding. See Ra-
bin, The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, in THE DuTy OF FAIR REP-
RESENTATION 84, 92 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
101. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 (1967) (union sent grievant to a
doctor for physical examination); Bures v. Houston Symphony, 503 F.2d 842, 843
(5th Cir. 1974) (players committee requested that discharged musician
audition).
102. See, e.g., Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 85 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,081 (W.D.
Mich. 1978), in which grievant had been discharged for stealing meat. The
grievant claimed he told the suppliers to bill him and his employer separately
for separate purchases he made, yet all of the meat was charged to his em-
ployer's account. The union official did not question any of the employees at
the supplier's packing house concerning the incident or investigate the truth of




union should be able to delegate some of the responsibility for
gathering evidence to the grievant.
Another Supreme Court case bears on the issue of ade-
quacy of fact investigation. In Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, 103 the grievance at issue was a claim of wrongful dis-
charge, which depended primariy on a fact question: whether
the grievants had falsely reported motel receipts. Though the
union took the claim to arbitration, it was unsuccessful in get-
ting the employees reinstated. The employees then sued both
the union and the employer on the ground that the union failed
to investigate the claim properly, and that if it had, it would
have discovered exculpatory evidence which was never
presented to the arbitrator. The Court found the allegations
sufficient to state a claim that the union had breached its duty
of fair representation, with the result that the arbitration deci-
sion could be set aside.1 0 4 In Vaca, the Supreme Court had
said that the union could not process a grievance perfuncto-
rily;S05 in Hines, the Court expanded the definition of perfunc-
tory processing to include the failure to investigate facts
necessary to the grievant's case. The Court's opinion, which
appears to require the union to gather the facts on which the
grievance is based, implies that there is some obligation on the
part of the union to consider and evaluate the evidence that its
investigation yields. Otherwise, requiring the union to investi-
gate would be an unnecessary and futile gesture.
2. The Duty to Comply with the Grievance Procedure
In order to ensure that a grievance is not abandoned until
after it has been investigated and its merits fully considered, a
union should be required to comply with all procedural steps
preliminary to arbitration.10 6 If a grievance is extinguished be-
cause the union fails to comply with a procedural requirement,
such as timely filing, the employee's opportunity to obtain a
meaningful determination on the merits is lost.107 This union
behavior would seem to constitute a violation of the Supreme
Court's proscription against processing a grievance perfuncto-
rily and against arbitrarily ignoring meritorious grievances.
103. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
104. Id. at 571.
105. 386 U.S. at 194.
106. Feller, supra note 17, at 666-718; Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Rep-
resentation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 277 (1977).
107. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (following the
analogy of fair union process to due process of administrative agencies).
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The decisions of the circuits are in conflict on this point,10
8
108. Although deciding the cases on other grounds, the Supreme Court im-
plicitly approved the sanctioning of union negligence in failing to comply with
the grievance procedure in two recent cases dealing with the scope of damages
in § 301-breach of duty suits. Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 103 S. Ct
588 (1983); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). The
First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that failure to investi-
gate or failure to appeal a grievance in a timely manner constitutes a breach of
the duty. See, e.g., Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710
(10th Cir. 1978) (union failure to fie plaintiffs grievance timely raised a jury
question whether union breached the duty of fair representation), a'd 442
U.S. 42 (1979); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328, 330-32 (2nd Cir.
1974) (union representative's unintentional failure to file a timely second step
complaint constituted breach of the duty of fair representation). For an ex-
haustive analysis of Schun, see Feller, supra note 17, at 666-718. See also De
Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.).
(jury's finding of unfair representation sustained when union failed to investi-
gate or make any judgment concerning the merits of plaintiffs grievance), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (Ruzicka I),
the union failed to file grievance forms after being granted two extensions. The
Sixth Circuit rejected a requirement of bad faith or intentional conduct and in-
stead found the union's inaction to constitute perfunctory handling in breach of
its duty. The court focused on the fact that the union's failure to act was unex-
plained and that the union failed to examine the merits of the grievance. Id. at
310. The court applied the Ruzicka I standard in two subsequent cases, Wil-
liams v. Teamster Local Union No. 984, 625 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1980), and Milstead
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 896 (1981). In Williams, the union inexplicably failed to process a griev-
ance which was supported by clear contract language and was uncontested by
the company. 625 F.2d at 139. In Milstead, the union breached its duty by fail-
ing to scrutinize the appropriate terms of the contract relating to the plaintiff's
grievance. 580 F.2d at 235-36. In both cases, the union's inaction was unex-
plained and not based on a determination of the merits.
Recently, the scope of the Ruzicka I standard has been narrowed in a sec-
ond opinion. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981) (Ru-
zicka II). Under Ruzicka I, a union may defend a perfunctory conduct charge
by offering evidence justifying the way in which the grievance was handled. In
Ruzicka II, the court recognized evidence of the union's reliance on the em-
ployer's past practice of freely granting extensions. Prior to the second opin-
ion, the court had suggested that only a decision on the merits would defeat a
charge of perfunctory conduct. See Ruzicka I, 523 F.2d at 310. Under Ruzicka
II, a failure to proceed is not perfunctory conduct when the union's failure to
act is "based on a wholly relevant consideration, is not intended to harm its
member, and is not the type of arbitrariness which reflects reckless disregard
for the rights of the individual employee." 649 F.2d at 1212.
In Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airway Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-91 (9th Cir.
1978), the union representative failed to inform the grievant of the circum-
stances surrounding a settlement offer made by the company. As a direct re-
sult of the union's failure, the grievant rejected the company's reinstatement
offer. Relying on Ruzicka I, Griffin v. United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), and De Arroyo, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the union's unintentional failure to inform was so egregious that
a trier of fact could find it amounted to arbitrary and perfunctory behavior. 573
F.2d at 1091. When a failure to inform had no substantial impact on the griev-
ants claim, however, the court declined to find perfunctory conduct amounting
to breach. See Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). In
Singer, the union failed to inform the grievant of the grievance hearing and, as
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however. Recently, cases from the United States Courts of Ap-
a result, he did not attend. The court found no perfunctory conduct and no
breach of the duty because the only issues involved contract interpretation,
and thus, the failure to inform was not prejudicial. Id. at 1354. The court distin-
guished Singer from Robesky by noting that in Robesky the plaintiff was
clearly prejudiced by the union's failure to inform him. Id. See also Stephens
v. Postmaster General, 623 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1980). The court has also indi-
cated that a failure to investigate may constitute perfunctory conduct in breach
of the duty of fair representation. See Hughes v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977). In Hughes, the union decided not to
arbitrate a wrongful discharge claim on the basis of a "sham" interview with
the plaintiff. The court found a breach of duty on the basis of evidence of both
bad faith and perfunctory handling. Id. at 368.
On the other hand, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that a failure
to comply with the grievance procedure did not constitute breach of the duty of
fair representation in itself, and that scienter is required. See, e.g, Coe v.
United Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978) (union representative un-
intentionally misnumbered the plaintiff's grievance, and, as a result, the claim
was unsuccessful. The Fifth Circuit treated the mistake as an issue of negli-
gence and relied on Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), and Bazarte v. United Transp. Union,
429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970) for the proposition that negligent conduct does not
amount to a breach.).
The Seventh Circuit's opinions are conflicting. In Miller v. Gateway Trans-
portation, 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980), an employee was discharged for refusing
to carry out a work assignment which he claimed violated trucking industry
regulations. The union's representation during the grievance process consisted
solely of a reading of the employee's written grievances. Id. at 274. The court
held that this minimal representation together with a failure to investigate the
claim raised a substantial issue of fact concerning perfunctory handling of the
grievance in breach of the union's duty. Id. at 277. See also Baldini v. Local
Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d 145, 150-151 (7th Cir. 1978). However, in Hoffman v.
Lonza, 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981), a different panel of the Seventh Circuit held
that a union official's failure to appeal because he forgot to appeal was not a
breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 522.
Consistent with the majority of courts is the decision of the Third Circuit
that an employee must demonstrate that the union's conduct was prejudicial.
See Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1981). In Findley, the
company informed an employee that his telephoned refusal to accept a work
assignment constituted a voluntary quit. The employee claimed that he had
been unable to understand the company dispatcher over the phone because of
a bad connection and that, in any event, he called back to accept the assign-
ment shortly thereafter. Id. at 956. The grievant complained that the union's
failure to secure a statement from the company dispatcher regarding the call
constituted perfunctory conduct. The court rejected the claim stating that
since the plaintiff failed to inform the court of what the witness would have
said, there is no indication that the failure to obtain the statement was in any
way prejudicial. Id. at 956-60.
The position of other Circuits on this issue is uncertain. See, e.g., Wyatt v.
Interstate & Ocean Treas. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980). In Wyatt, the com-
pany discharged the plaintiff because of a physical disability. Instead of fully
investigating all of the plaintiff's medical records, the union representative re-
lied solely on the company's statements to determine whether the claim was
meritorious. Id. at 890-91. Citing Griin, the Fourth Circuit stated that indiffer-
ence or grossly deficient conduct could constitute a breach. The court, how-
ever, did not reach the merits of the case, and, as a result, the meaning of the
opinion is unclear. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's reading of Griffi, as well
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peals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have come out differ-
ently on virtually identical facts.l0 9 In each case, the union
official forgot to fie an appeal within the time limit allowed by
the contract, thus terminating the grievant's claim of wrongful
discharge. In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 11o the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that failing to appeal a claim without reason was a
breach of the duty of fair representation. In Hoffman v.
Lonza, " on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit held that such
union conduct was not actionable.
To reach its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit held that some
degree of scienter was required to breach the duty of fair repre-
sentation. This decision is a marked departure from the deci-
sions of other courts of appeals112 and from the Seventh
Circuit's earlier decisions.113 The Lonza court based its deci-
sion in part on Supreme Court dicta of dubious precedential
value114 and in part on a misreading of the policies underlying
as its reliance on such cases as Ruzicka I and DeArroyo, suggests that a failure
to investigate may amount to unfair representation. See 623 F.2d at 891.
The Eighth Circuit has indicated that a union's failure to investigate or to
fie a grievance timely may constitute perfunctory treatment. In Minnis v.
United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implements Workers, 531 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1975), an employee was discharged for having falsified a medical form
relating to sick leave pay. The union reluctantly accepted the grievance, then
failed to process it in a timely manner and refused to investigate. The union
finally dropped the grievance without notifying the grievant. Id. at 853. The
court held that the evidence would support inferences of bad faith and arbi-
trary and capricious conduct. Id. A recent Eighth Circuit decision modifies the
Minnis standard. See Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979). A union's failure to fie timely was found
not to be perfunctory treatment when the failure was a result of a mistake in
construing the contract language and the union had otherwise pursued the
claim competently. Id. at 736. Even when an employee is prejudiced by union
conduct as in Ethier, a breach will be found only where the union's mistakes or
failures are inexplicable.
109. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981); Hoff-
man v. Lonza, 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
110. 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981).
111. 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
112. See supra note 108.
113. See Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978); Bar-
ton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976).
114. The basis for the court's decision was dicta revived from the Supreme
Court decision in Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1970). Although Lockridge characterized
union actions which breach the duty of fair representation as requiring bad
faith in the form of "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest
conduct," id. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)), the
issue was tangential to the case, having been regarded as irrelevant in the deci-
sion below. Id. at 279-80, 300.
Furthermore, five years after Lockridge, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Supreme Court reiterated the language of Vaca v. Sipes,
which suggests that arbitrary union conduct, absent bad faith, can constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation. See id. at 569. Hines omitted refer-
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the duty of fair representation as a threshold issue in em-
ployee-employer cases.11 5 It appears that the Lonza decision,
in which only two judges of the court participated, will not be
the last word in that circuit on this issue.
Conversely, in Ruzicka I, the Sixth Circuit found that a
union's failure to appeal a grievance in a timely manner, if
done without reason, violates the duty of fair representation."
6
Subsequently, in Ruzicka II, the union argued that it had a rea-
son for failing to appeal the claim in. a timely manner. The
union claimed it had relied on the employer's previous practice
of granting time extensions for filing appeals. The Sixth Circuit
held that this claim, if proved, would constitute a defense, and
stated that a union does not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion as long as it can articulate some legitimate reason for its
inaction. In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the
ence to Lockridge. The basic difference between the nature of the actions in
Hines and in Lockridge may explain the subtle difference in the Court's char-
acterization. While Hines was bottomed on a breach of contract claim against
the employer, Lockridge was not. Lockridge was a suit against the union alone
for allegedly tortious action for breach of the duty of fair representation based
on the union's construction of a union security clause. A distinction requiring
scienter in one case but not in the other may be based on the different func-
tions of the duty of fair representation in the respective lawsuits. When the
lawsuit is for a union's tortious action alone, it may be reasonable to limit em-
ployee suits against the union to those cases involving bad faith or discrimina-
tion, since a wide range of union actions may potentially cause some harm to
the member of its bargaining unit. When the action is a hybrid § 301 breach of
duty action, however, the union is in a special position to cause injury to the
employee through nonfeasance rather than malfeasance, so it is appropriate to
hold the union to a higher duty of care.
115. The court's second reason for deciding that the union's conduct did not
violate the duty of fair representation was that such a finding would expose the
employer to suit and upset the employer's interest in the finality of the griev-
ance termination. 658 F.2d at 522. This rationale reflects a misconception about
the purpose of the duty of fair representation and its relation to the employer's
interest in finality. The Supreme Court's articulated purpose for using the duty
of fair representation as a threshold issue was to insulate the griev-
ance/arbitration system from being undermined by employee suits and to pro-
tect from challenge the union's ability to settle grievances and to make
decisions for the collective good. The Supreme Court's purpose was not to in-
sulate the employer from having to defend against charges of contract breach.
In fact, this rationale is at odds with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision
in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). In Hines, the
Supreme Court expressly decided that, although generally the employer can
rely on the finality of the decision, there is an exception to the rule when the
contractual process has been seriously flawed by the union's breach of its duty.
In that circumstance, the union's breach removes the contractual bar of finality.
Id. at 570-71. But see Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
116. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981). This de-
cision, however, shows the limitations of using the negligence standard. Al-
though the court stated that simple negligence would not violate the duty, the
court determined that failing to file an appeal was more egregious than simple
negligence. Id-. at 1212.
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union's justification to cases in which the union determined
that the grievance was not meritorious. There is, however, a vi-
tal distinction between these two situations. In the latter, the
grievant receives a decision on the merits; in the case at bar,
where the union expected a deadline extension, the grievant
received no such decision. Thus, when the union miscalculates
the employer's willingness to extend filing deadlines, the griev-
ant is likely to be less satisfied with the fairness of the
process. 1 7
There may be a reason, different from the one the Sixth
Circuit articulated, which justifies judicial deference when a
union miscalculates an employer's willingness to extend a filing
deadline. A union that fails to appeal a grievance in reliance on
prior practice cannot be expected to foresee that the employer
has decided to change the practice. At the time, the union may
believe it is complying with the grievance procedure. For a
court to second-guess the union when it has made a mistake, in
good faith reliance on prior practice, rather than through care-
lessness, would be to hold the union to an unrealistic standard
of prescience. Sanctioning the union's conduct in hindsight
will not improve future union representation. In contrast, a
union that fails to appeal without reason can be expected to
know that its failure will terminate the grievance. Imposing
sanctions for this conduct will encourage the union to act delib-
eratively. Thus, although sanctions against a union that acted
carelessly have some justification, less justification exists for
penalizing a union that mistakenly chose the wrong strategy in
its good faith efforts at representation.
3. The Problem of Advocacy Strategy
A union frequently must make choices about how best to
represent an employee in advocating his or her claim.118 The
bar of finality should protect these union judgments" 9 in the
117. Cf. Riley v. Letter Carriers Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1981).
118. Professor Rabin notes that "courts, except in the egregious cases...
seldom disturb arbitration awards in the name of fair representation." This
may be, he suggests, because "second-guessing a union's decision not to take a
case to arbitration is hard enough; assessing its tactics and trial techniques
may well be impossible, let alone inappropriate." Rabin, supra note 100, at 90-
91. For a discussion of the constraints and pressures on union decisionmaking,
see supra text accompanying note 94.
119. See, e.g., Carroll v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025, 1028
(1st Cir. 1969) (when union, for unspecified tactical reasons, refused to present
plaintiff's plea for clemency despite his request, court approved good faith tac-




same manner that the bar of finality protects union fact finding
which is based on facts available at the time. Reconsideration
of these union judgments by a court cannot improve union rep-
resentation. Thus, if a union, in the good faith belief that a dis-
charge grievance is not winnable on the facts, argues for the
employer's forgiveness or an arbitrator's mercy, that tactical
decision should be protected from second-guessing by a judge
or jury. The bar of finality should be lifted only when the con-
sequences of the union's inaction were clearly foreseeable.
Ironically, some courts have found that a union may have
violated its duty of fair representation by negligent processing
even when the underlying grievance was not meritorious.12
0
Since arbitrating a nonmeritorious claim will not yield a benefit
to the employee,12 1 one might wonder whether the union's neg-
ligence prejudiced the employee. If not, it is difficult to imagine
why such conduct should amount to a breach of duty. In evalu-
ating the position that courts should take on this issue, it is
useful to identify the purposes that a finding of breach of the
duty could serve. First, if a court imposes sanctions on a union
for negligent grievance processing, irrespective of whether the
claim is meritorious, the union may be deterred from process-
ing future grievances negligently. Second, a sanction imposed
for union negligence restores integrity to the griev-
ance/arbitration process. Since employees have a legitimate
interest not only in the outcome of the grievance, but also in
the process itself, some type of sanction may be appropriate to
satisfy the employee's interest and confidence in the private
dispute resolution system. But these purposes-restoration of
employee confidence and deterrence of future negligence-
must be balanced against the cost of court interference with
the result the parties have reached through the private dispute
resolution system. When there is no injured employee to pro-
tect, court interference in the process is less justifiable.
4. The Problem of Erroneous Fact Finding
An additional question concerning union fact finding re-
mains unanswered: may a court reverse a grievance outcome
when it finds the union has materially erred in fact finding?
120. Kaiser v. Local No. 83, 577 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1978). But see Findley
v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958-60 (3d Cir. 1981); Singer v. Flying Tiger
Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1981). In both these cases, the courts
required the employee to prove that the union's failure to comply with the pro-
cedure was prejudicial to the grievant.
121. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435
F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971).
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Certainly, a court cannot hold that a union breached its duty of
fair representation merely because the court would have found
a different version of the facts. That would be substituting the
court's interpretation of the evidence for the union's and would
not justify jeopardizing the benefits that flow from judicial def-
erence to union decisionmaking. But must a court uphold a
union's decision if it finds both that no reasonable union could
have made that factual determination and that the employee-
grievant has been injured? A court is quite likely to sidestep
this question and recast the claim to fit under one of the other
areas of breach of the duty of fair representation. For example,
a court may find that a union's erroneous fact finding is due to
an incomplete investigation. Alternatively, a court may decide
that a union's erroneous fact finding gives rise to an inference
that the union acted in bad faith by ignoring evidence that
would have led a reasonable union to conclude that the griev-
ance was meritorious.122 Once a court has determined that a
union has breached some aspect of its fair representation duty,
the court can proceed to correct the erroneous fact finding in
the process of considering the merits of the claim for breach of
contract. In each case, the appropriate court response may
have to depend upon balancing the institutional cost of upset-
ting the finality of even an erroneously made grievance deter-
mination against the cost to the employee-grievant of an
unremedied breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
In Hines, the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that it
would balance these countervailing values in favor of finality.
In acting on the case before it, however, the Court did not sepa-
rate the elements of inadequate union investigation and possi-
ble union dishonesty. The Court stated:
The grievance processes cannot be expected to be error-free. The final-
ity provision has sufficient force to surmount occasional instances of
mistake. But it is quite another matter to suggest that erroneous arbi-
tration decisions must stand even though the employee's representa-
tion by the union has been dishonest, in bad faith, or discriminatory;
for in that event, error and injustice of the grossest sort would multi-
ply. The contractual system would then cease to qualify as an ade-
quate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging failure of
the employer to abide by the contract. 123
It must be noted that Hines can be distinguished because the
122. See Anderson v. Grocers Supply Co., 483 F. Supp. 73, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(union's failure to call witnesses favorable to claimant and its failure to ques-
tion company witnesses raised substantial issue of fact regarding bad faith of
the union representative). Cf. Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977); Minnis v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricul-
tural Implements Workers, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975).
123. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
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policy favoring finality of process when the grievance has been
arbitrated is weightier than the policy favoring finality when
the grievance has been resolved short of arbitration.124 Since
the union is responsible for both gathering information and
making the decision whether to arbitrate the grievance based
on that information, there is greater potential for an erroneous
result in the pre-arbitration setting, as well as less cost in set-
ting the result aside, when the grievance process has not
culminated in arbitration.125
In summary, when the merits of a grievance turn on facts,
the union should be required to act much as an adjudicative
administrative agency does-investigate the claim, gather evi-
dence, decide whether the evidence supports the claim and, if
the evidence does support the claim, vigorously demand arbi-
tration. In this type of grievance, the conflicting policies at
stake are preserving finality and protecting the individual em-
ployee whose grievance will go unremedied if the court does
not examine the merits of the grievance. Conspicuously absent
in this situation are conflicting interests of other employees of
the bargaining unit.12 6 Employees who are not involved in the
124. Professor Rabin comments that with regard to those cases taken to ar-
bitration, the arbitrator can and
should insure that all aspects of the case are adequately explored, par-
ticularly where the arbitrator suspects that the union is not doing an
adequate job .... The arbitrator is the last neutral body in a position
to properly assess whether the individual has had his day in court, and
he ought to make sure the individual's case is adequately developed.
Rabin, The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration,
29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 851, 872-73 (1978).
125. Neither the union nor the employer has as great an institutional stake
in unarbitrated grievances, as they have in grievances which have been
arbitrated.
126. See Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the
Individual Employee, 51 Tsx. L. REv. 1179, 1229-30 (1973).
An exception to this statement may be a situation in which, for example,
finding one employee did not falsify claim checks leads to the implication that
another employee did. In addition, other employees may have a valid pro-
tectible interest in the union's determination of the truth of whether an em-
ployee-grievant is capable of performing the job, since that employee's
performance affects their safety or the quality of the product collectively pro-
duced. In these situations, the union may be justified in acting in the group
interest, if not in the grievant's interest, by requiring the grievant to take addi-
tional measures to demonstrate his work qualifications or capability. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. General Motors Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1009 (8th Cir.
1981); Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d 107, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1980) (indi-
vidual member of the airline pilot's association declined to accept assignment
with grievant except under written protest which resulted in a routine test of
grievant's ability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980); Florey v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, 575 F.2d 673, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1978) (airline pilot's association's refusal to
attest to the grievant's sobriety as required by the FAA resulted in his loss of
certification); Bures v. Houston Symphony Soc'y, 503 F.2d 842, 843 (5th Cir.
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grievance have no protectible interest in differing versions of
the facts. Their only interest is an interest shared by the griev-
ant-that the union act fairly and find the facts accurately, so
the contract can be fully enforced and the integrity of the sys-
tem maintained. Since no conflicting collective interests are at
stake, the focus of the inquiry is on the reliability of the fact
finding, and the union should be encouraged to represent the
individual employee to the fullest extent possible by making
determinations based on the facts before deciding to abandon a
grievance.
B. UNION INTERPRETATION OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT IN ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A GRIEVANCE
Under the fair process model of grievance processing, in or-
der to consider the merits of a grievance fully, a union must
evaluate not only the facts, but the applicable "law" as well.
The applicable law includes, of course, the contract language,
established plant customs and practices, and prior arbitration
decisions interpreting the contract language and plant prac-
tices. 27 The fair process model requires that a union ascertain
whether any contract language or unwritten plant practice pro-
vides a basis for a claim of breach of contract. The easy case is
one in which the contract language is clear and runs counter to
the grievant's claim. In this case, the union may unquestiona-
bly abandon a grievance.128 In the absence of allegations of bad
faith or discrimination, a court may also summarily dispose of a
lawsuit based on this defense.129 If the grievance poses at least
an arguable question of contract interpretation, however, both
the union, in the first instance, and the court, in any subse-
quent action, must engage in a more complicated deliberation.
1974) (players committee requested, a musician who had been discharged for
incompetence, to audition before it before deciding whether to go forward with
his appeal).
127. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 86. See, e.g., Franklin v. Crosby
Typesetting Co., 568 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1978); Csanadi v. Teamsters, 463 F.
Supp. 276, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Keeler v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 95
L.R.RM. (BNA) 3050, 3051 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (summary judgment granted to
union when contract clause governing seniority ran counter to grievants'
claim); Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (summary
judgment granted to the union when disability benefits claim was clearly with-
out merit under the contract).
129. See Mitchell v. Amalgamated Council of Greyhound Drivers, No. 78-
3452 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir fie); Dill
v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970).
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1. Contract Interpretation When the Interests of Other
Employees are Implicated in the Grievance
Outcome
a. Modeling Contract Interpretation on Administrative Law
A union's role in resolving grievances which present an ar-
guable interpretation of a contract is likely to be more complex
because the interpretation pressed by the grievant may conflict
with the interests of other members of the bargaining unit.
Conflicts of interest between employees within the bargaining
unit are recurrent and inevitable in both the original contract
negotiation phase and the subsequent contract enforcement
phase.13 0 Conflicts occur because individual employees who
have different interests and assign different priorities to those
interests' 3 ' are forced to bargain collectively through the union.
Different interpretations of the same contract language may
benefit different groups of employees. By pressing for one in-
terpretation, the union may favor the grievants, but disfavor an-
other group of employees within its bargaining unit to whom it
also owes a duty of representation. 3 2 This problem is most ap-
parent when employees are competing for the same limited
benefit, such as promotion, work unit assignment, or senior-
ity. 3 3 Each affected group may pressure the union to interpret
130. "Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of
employees." Ford Motor Co. v. Hoffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Although con-
flicts will surface routinely during contract negotiation, some conflicts will suc-
ceed the adoption of the contract and are likely to cause further problems in
the course of grievance processing.
131. For example, older employees may assign a high priority to securing
adequate pension plans, while younger employees are concerned about higher
pay or more vacation time. Employees with families may be interested in more
holidays or better insurance plans. See D. BOK & J. DuNLop, LABOR AND THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 114 (1970); Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach
and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Offcials and the Worker in Collec-
tive Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 401 (1964). Systems analysts would refer
to this situation as a case of differing "utility functions." See R. KEENEY & H.
RAiFFA, DECISIONS wrrH Mu TIPLE OBJECTIVES (1977).
132. Failure to consider the effect on other employees would expose the
union to suit for breach of the duty of fair representation by those employees
who were not a party to the original grievance, but were affected by its resolu-
tion. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964); Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
133. The position a union takes on a seniority grievance will affect all other
employees who will be above the grievant on the seniority list if his case fails,
but below him if his case succeeds. See, e.g., Denver Stereotypers & Electrotyp-
ers Union, Local 13 v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 134, 135 (10th Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. Amal-
gamated Council of Greyhound Drivers, No. 78-3452 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1980)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir fie); King v. Space Carriers, Inc., 608
F.2d 283, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1979); Ryan v. New York Newspapers Printing Press-
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the contract in that group's favor.134 For institutional reasons,
the union may choose to support the more powerful group, usu-
ally the group which constitutes the majority, without consider-
ing the merits of the claim. This practice will regularly
jeopardize the interests of minorities or individuals.
When a grievant's interest in pursuing his or her claim con-
flicts with the interests of other employees in the bargaining
unit, commentators have subscribed to two different schools of
thought. The two schools reflect opposing views of how much
discretion a union should have in balancing individual and
group interests and the extent to which the contract should
limit union discretion. One theory assumes that contract lan-
guage creates entitlements in the employees; 135 the other as-
sumes that employees have only those rights that the union is
men's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 454 (2d Cir. 1979); Burchfield v. United Steel-
workers of Am., 577 F.2d 1018, 1020 (5th Cir. 1978).
134. To the extent that fair representation includes the notion of equal rep-
resentation, once a union has taken a position on the meaning of a contract
term, it should be bound to interpret the term consistently. Thus, prior prac-
tices are relevant to the issue of a union's freedom to choose different interpre-
tations of a contract term.
135. A primary proponent of this view is Professor Clyde Summers. Profes-
sor Summers has identified six categories of cases in which the union would be
deemed to have breached its duty of fair representation to the employee-griev-
ant. Four of them pertain to the entitlement theory-
1. The individual employee has a right to have clear and unques-
tioned terms of the collective agreement that have been made for his
benefit, followed and enforced until the agreement is properly
amended. For the union to refuse to follow and enforce the rules and
standards it has established on behalf of those it represents is arbi-
trary and constitutes a violation of its fiduciary obligation.
2. The individual employee has no right to insist on any particular
interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a collective agreement, for
the union must be free to settle a grievance in accordance with any
reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous provision. However, the in-
dividual has a right that ambiguous provisions be applied consistently
and that the provision mean the same when applied to him as when ap-
plied to other employees. Settlement of similar grievances on different
terms is discriminatory and violates the union's duty to represent all
employees equally.
3. The union has no duty to carry every grievance to arbitration;
the union can sift out grievances that are trivial or lacking in merit.
However, the individual's right to equal treatment includes equal ac-
cess to the grievance procedure and arbitration for similar grievances
of equal merit.
4. The individual employee has a right to have his grievance de-
cided on its own merits. The union violates its duty to represent fairly
when it trades an individual's meritorious grievance for the benefit of
another individual or of the group. Majority vote does not necessarily
validate grievance settlements, but may instead, make the settlement
suspect as based on political power and not the merits of the grievance.
Summers, supra note 13, at 279.
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willing to enforce. 3 6 While the former theory creates a fixed
system of rights, the latter creates a system of floating rights.
Under the first theory, the contract creates vested entitle-
ments in the employee that cannot be waived without his or
her consent, unless the contract is amended. Presumably,
amendments can only operate prospectively, so that accrued
contract rights cannot be changed even by contract amend-
ment. Since under this theory only clear contract language cre-
ates entitlements, a union is still free to decide between
employee groups when the contract language is ambiguous.
According to the theory's adherents, courts should intervene
whenever combined union and employer actions threaten to
deprive an employee of an entitlement.
Under the contrasting theory, a contract entitles employees
to only those rights that the union is willing to enforce. This
theory views contract negotiation and enforcement as a contin-
uum.13 7 Since the union negotiates the contract, the union can
also waive the contract's terms. Second, this theory challenges
the notion that any contract term can be expressed in clear lan-
guage. Contract terms deal with general situations, so that
each specific application of a term inevitably requires an inter-
pretation of the term's intended scope. Thus, according to the
theory's adherents, there is no reliable basis for distinguishing
contract language that creates an entitlement from contract
language that does not. Third, because federal policy generally
disfavors court intervention in private employment relations,
the theory concludes that the union and the employer should
be able to agree to waive contract language through continued
bargaining. Under this theory, courts should intervene only if
an employee can prove that the union acted out of discrimina-
tory, hostile, or otherwise wrongful subjective feelings toward
the grievant. At the extreme, adherence to this theory could re-
sult in ad hoc, item-by-item contract revision, regardless of the
individual grievants' expectations.
Because the two theories proceed from different assump-
tions of how conflicting individual and group interests should
be balanced, arguing the merits of the different theories leads
ultimately to the basic issue which lies at the center of the un-
resolved means-ends debate of Kantian versus Utilitarian juris-
136. A primary proponent of this view is Professor David Feller. See Feller,
supra note 17, at 774.
137. Support for this premise can be found in the oft-quoted words of the
Supreme Court: 'The grievance procedure is ... a part of the continuous col-
lective bargaining process." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav-
igation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
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prudence.138 It is from this jurisprudential dilemma' 39 that
some practical considerations drawn from administrative juris-
prudence can attempt to save us. Focusing on the notion of
fairness of process may lead to some tentative conclusions re-
garding how this means-ends debate should be resolved in the
grievance processing context.
In the last section, the administrative agency analogy es-
tablished a model of the union as a neutral fact finder; here, the
analogy provides a model of the union as a neutral mediator of
employee interests. Because of the contract's existence, how-
ever, the union may not be able to mediate employee interests
as freely as it mediates interests in contract negotiation. The
contract language has created certain employee expectations,
and frustrating these expectations will lead to employee dissat-
isfaction. The situation is similar to that in which an adminis-
trative agency involved in mediating interests has taken a
position by promulgating a rule. 40 The existence of the rule
operates as a greater restraint to change than if the agency had
promulgated no rule at all.
Statutory policy, as expressed in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA),14' generally requires that an agency provide
affected parties with an opportunity to participate, before the
138. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Although to this author
the entitlement theory seems preferable to the floating rights theory, it is diffi-
cult to say that there may not be some exigent circumstances where the
greater good of the majority justifies depriving the individual of his or her enti-
tlement. See, e.g., L KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L.
Beck trans. 1959) (within Kant's jurisprudence, a person must be treated "al-
ways as an end and never as a means only" if that treatment is to be ethical).
See also L KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (W. Hastie trans. 1887), and J. BEN-
THAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789)
(Bentham determines whether group action is right by focusing on the sum of
the interests of the individual members. Under Bentham's utilitarian principle,
group action is right if the action promotes the greatest interest of the greatest
number. Thus, contrary interests of individual members will be subordinated
to the group's interest.). For current scholarship where the debate continues,
see, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrLTION (1977); R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
139. The classic example of this situation is the life raft where one individ-
ual owns the only means of survival In an era of economic upheaval, a similar
example may be plant closings. See infra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
140. Professor David Feller, a proponent of what is here referred to as the
floating rights theory, argues that the collective agreement is not a contract cre-
ating rights but instead is a rulemaking process creating rules. See Feller,
supra note 17, at 774. Unfortunately, Professor Feller does not press this analy-
sis further to realize that an employee has an expectation in the continued en-
forcement of rules which operate in his or her favor.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
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agency may change its rules.142 This opportunity for affected
parties to participate is accorded regardless of whether their in-
terest under the rule rises to the level of an "entitlement."1
43
Underlying the APA position is the belief that participation al-
lows the individual to bring to the decisionmaker information
about the value of the expectation to the individual. Participa-
tion may also enable a compromise to be made between con-
flicting interests, and can have a cathartic effect on the
individual's acceptance of the ultimate decision. In the griev-
ance context, if it is necessary for a union to subordinate a
grievant's expectations to the greater good of the majority, an
opportunity to participate in the union's decision can promote
similar values. The extent of the opportunity to participate
may not be subject to exact prescription because it may de-
pend on the particular structure of the grievance process and
on the union's internal structure, and thus it is best left the
subject of union experimentation. At the very least, however, it
would seem that the union official or panel, which decides
whether to pursue a grievance, should be obligated to listen to
the employee's side of the matter.144
142. Agency rules can be promulgated through a notice and comment proce-
dure or an adjudicative procedure. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557 (1976).
Rules adopted after a notice and comment process have only prospective appli-
cation, whereas rules adopted in adjudication are frequently applied to the case
being adjudicated. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). Both processes, however, accord affected parties
an opportunity to participate.
143. Another administrative law analogue is possible, that of entitlement
theory, rather than administrative rulemaking. With regard to entitlement
analysis, constitutional due process has been preoccupied with the same con-
cerns afflicting entitlement analysis in the grievance context discussed earlier.
Compare Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary The-
ory, 61 B.UJL. REV. 885, 898-906 (1981) with Shulman, Reason; Contract and Law
in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955). The basic issue is whether an
entitlement exists, since the consequence of finding an entitlement determines
whether due process attaches at all. If due process attaches, it will likely re-
quire an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking in some way, possibly by
a trial type hearing. When the entitlement rises to the level of a fifth amend-
ment property interest, due process requires just compensation when overrid-
ing group interests require that an individual's entitlement be taken.
144. This view is consistent with Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964),
the major Supreme Court case raising the issue of conflicting employee inter-
ests in the grievance context. This case is most often cited for upholding the
union's decision to side with one group of employees over another in a senior-
ity dispute stemming from a merger of two operations. Id. at 349-50. The case
is also important for acknowledging some right to employee participation in the
decisionmaking. After holding that the union was entitled to take the position
it did, the Court recognized that a question remained whether the adversely af-
fected employees were deprived of a fair hearing. The Court resolved this fac-
tual question by stating. "Dealers employees had notice of the hearing; they
were obviously aware that they were locked in a struggle for jobs and seniority
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Devising a model for union behavior based on the affected
individual's legitimate expectations comes close to the entitle-
ment theory mentioned earlier. After all, legitimate expecta-
tions, like entitlements, are based on clear contract language.
Unlike the entitlement theory, however, which would require
that a union never waive an entitlement by declining to process
a meritorious grievance, the administrative law analogy treats
expectations created by clear contract language merely as a
point of departure for inquiry into what decisionmaking proce-
dure is appropriate and what type of employee participation
should be accorded. Grievances based on such expectations
should not be lightly dismissed, but, if a grievance must be dis-
missed because of some overriding group interest, fairness of
process would seem to require according the grievant an oppor-
tunity to participate in that decision.
Thus, a fair process approach arrives at an accommodation
of the best attributes of both the opposing schools of thought.
The fair process standard secures employee expectations in
benefits provided by contract, but avoids the all or nothing
problem of the entitlement theory, in which the entire question
of fair representation turns on whether the contract language
creates an entitlement. Yet, the fair process approach allows a
union, when necessary, to maintain the importance of collective
interests over individual ones, 145 provided the union accords
the individual some opportunity to participate in the decision.
Further inquiry into fairness of process should include an
examination not only of the contract enforcement process, but
also of the negotiation process which typically brings contract
clauses into existence. A particular contract clause may repre-
sent the culmination of discussion among the rank and file dur-
ing the negotiation of the contract from which employee
expectations were originally formed. Thus, in order to formu-
with the E & L drivers, and three stewards representing them went to the hear-
ing at union expense and were given every opportunity to state their position."
Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
145. Cf. Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights For the Employment Rela-
tion, 56 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980).
But while the vested-rights approach establishes a rigid rule, the duty
of fair representation restrains only when it would be unfair not to.
One may well say, as Professor Cox intimates, that in most instances it
will be an easily demonstrable breach of the duty not to pursue an ac-
crued wage claim on behalf of an individual employee. But in those
several instances in which the collective reasonably and fairly decides
that it is in the best interests of all employees not fully to pursue the
expectations of a single individual, the duty of fair representation al-




late a policy based on protecting employees' expectations, it is
necessary to view them against the backdrop of the typical ne-
gotiation process.
b. Group Dynamic Analysis: Interemployee Trading and the
Relational Balance Between Groups of Employees
In contract negotiation, individuals with similar prefer-
ences can be expected to form special interest groups to sup-
port particular contract terms. Because a collective bargaining
agreement will contain multiple terms and conditions, and be-
cause an individual's preferences reflect multiple interests, em-
ployees will form and re-form groups over the spectrum of
terms and conditions. 4 6
Although employees of the same bargaining unit often
have different preferences, that fact, by itself, need not cause
their interests to conflict.147 Conflicts of interest are inevitably
caused because resources available for employee benefits are
limited. As a practical matter, a union cannot press for every
conceivable benefit in negotiating a contract. While the em-
ployer may find it in its own interest to devote as few resources
as possible to employee benefits and while the union attempts
to obtain as many benefits as possible, there is an upper limit,
determined by the financial viability of the enterprise, above
which the employer cannot go. This limit affects the union's
negotiating strategy because the union must select which de-
mands to press at the bargaining table. Allocating a larger por-
tion of the total available benefits to one group of employees
will necessarily reduce the number of benefits available for
others, unless the union can find some way to increase the total
amount of benefits it can obtain from the employer.148 As a
practical matter, the maxim for resolving conflicts of interest
over limited resources is likely to be majority rule.
Following majority rule need not result in all contract
146. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 131, at 113.
147. For example, while the more senior group may not benefit from a pol-
icy favoring better probationary terms for new employees, the senior employ-
ees will not be harmed by it.
148. The Supreme Court has reflected some recognition of the fact that the
principle of limited resources lies behind employee conflict of interests:
An employer confronted with bargaining demands from each of several
minority groups would not necessarily, or even probably, be able to
agree to remedial steps satisfactory to all at once. Competing claims
on the employer's ability to accomodate each group's demands, e.g., for
reassignments and promotions to a limited number of positions, could
only set one group against the other ....




terms favoring a majority. 49 A minority's hope is that it can
obtain a favorable contract term by combining forces with
other minority factions or by trading votes. Because a collec-
tive bargaining agreement covers multiple issues, there is room
for employees to trade support on various parts of the final
package. Thus, unless a discrete majority of employees votes
as a bloc on every issue, one can expect minority coalitions to
form effective majorities on some issues.15 0 Bargaining for
some minority positions is also sound institutional strategy for
the union because it promotes more widespread satisfaction
within the group. Multiple issue voting and vote trading pro-
vide alternative means of gaining group approval by allowing
the losers on one issue to be compensated by gains on an-
other.'5 ' As the result of vote trading, the contract may well
contain terms different from those that would have been
reached had each item been voted on separately. Thus, the
final contract package represents not only an agreement be-
tween union and management on contract terms, but it also
represents agreements, reached in a deliberative trading pro-
cess, on how scarce resources are to be allocated among em-
ployees within the bargaining unit.
The foregoing analysis of negotiation has important impli-
cations for grievance processing. Unlike the agenda in contract
negotiation, grievances arise over issues governed by particular
contract language separately, rather than over all the issues
contained in the contract at once. If the union selectively exer-
cises its power to compel arbitration, the resulting allocation of
employee benefits may be different from the allocation of bene-
fits contemplated in the contract. Assuming that the union will
be responsive to majority opinion, the union can be expected to
arbitrate any grievance issue that affects a majority of employ-
ees. Most grievances, however, benefit only an individual or a
149. See D. BOK & J. DtmLOP, supra note 131, at 113. It is not enough that a
particular contract term would benefit a majority. In order for a term which fa-
vors the majority to be part of the union's demand, the term must be dominant
in the amalgam of the combined priorities of the majority. As Bok and Dunlop
have said, "Most negotiations do not consist of clear-cut choices between ma-
jority and minority interests. Rather, the union works with many demands that
are pressed with varying degrees of intensity by different groups." Id. See also
R. WALTON & R. McKERsE, A BEHAvORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATION
(1965).
150. For a fuller theoretical discussion of public choice in union negotiation,
see Freed, Polsby, & Spitzer, Unions, Employers, and the Conundrums of Collec-
tive Choice, 56 S.C.L. REv. 465 (1983). For a discussion of public choice theory,
see K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963).
151. See generally T. POGUE & L. SGoNTZ, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC
CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBUC FINANCE 179-82 (1978).
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minority of employees of the bargaining unit, making it difficult
to garner majority support for arbitrating the grievance, espe-
cially if the majority perceives some benefit from not arbitrat-
ing the grievance.
52
If contract language favorable to the minority is the result
of a trade, the minority may not be able to mobilize the same
support in contract enforcement that it received in contract ne-
gotiation. The same broad coalition that favored adoption of
the contract term may not support enforcement of the term
when not all the coalition members are affected. Thus, an
agreement negotiated on a multiple issue basis will regularly
be altered to the detriment of minorities if it is enforced by ma-
jority rule on an issue-by-issue basis.
This result hardly would seem fair to the minority group
that succeeded in obtaining a negotiated contract promise but
is unable to secure the enforcement of the promised benefit.
Consequently, federal labor policy should be structured to al-
low minorities subsumed in exclusive bargaining units to se-
cure the gains they achieve in negotiation. 53 Otherwise,
minority groups would lose the incentive to participate fully in
the collective bargaining process, contrary to congressional pol-
icy.154 If minority groups' bargaining efforts are not protected,
the union will be increasingly controlled by whatever homoge-
neous group of employees can defeat through grievance
processing any benefits minority subgroups obtained through
negotiation. More internal union strife, more unstable labor re-
lations, and threats to labor peace by disenfranchised minority
groups could result. A rule requiring union adherence to spe-
cific contract language, however, provides minorities with an in-
centive to participate in the collective bargaining process
because they can rely on the enforcement of contract gains
they obtain through participating in the process.
Because vote trading in contract negotiation is likely to be
obscure and the final package will reflect the employer's prefer-
152. The benefit may be in terms of union expenses saved, see infra text ac-
companying notes 192-200, or in terms of additional majority benefits gained by
sacrificing the grievant's interest, see infra text accompanying notes 202-17.
153. Cf. Silverstein, Union Decisions on Collective Bargaining Goals: A Pro-
posalfor Interest Group Participation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1977).
154. The Landrum-Griffln Act §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976) ensures
that minority voices can be heard in union affairs. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975). The Act ensures
union members the right to speak, vote, and participate in the affairs of the
union, subject to such reasonable rules as the union may adopt. The purpose
of this act commonly referred to as the "employee's Bill of Rights" is to enable
and encourage maximum participation of employees in union activities.
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ences as well as those of union members, courts will normally
be unable to determine which contract clauses were the result
of trading. The specificity of contract language provides a much
better guide for the protection of minority interests. If the con-
tract language is vague, majority rule is an appropriate basis on
which to proceed because the minority has no right to expect
or insist on any specific benefit absent clear contract language.
As in negotiation, the interest of the individual or the minority
must yield to majority group interest. 5 5 When contract lan-
guage favors the minority group, however, there is greater rea-
son for requiring the union to recognize the legitimate
expectations of the minority. Thus, adhering to specific con-
tract language eliminates the need for courts to investigate
whether the language was actually the result of a trade.
5 6
The fairness of using contract language as a limitation on
155. See Finkin, supra note 28, at 187.
156. Traditional contract analysis would lead to the same result. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1973). Under traditional contract
analysis, when contract language is ambiguous, a court is faced with several
problems not present when contract language is clear and specific. The court
must divine the intent of the employer and the union as parties to the contract.
Divining the intent of an ambiguous collective bargaining provision is a difficult
exercise, even for arbitrators skilled in interpreting the law of the shop. The
intent must be viewed "with some imagination of the purposes which lie be-
hind" the language. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 57 MIcH. L REv. 1, 27 (1958). 'The difficulty arises from the fact that
management and labor often have conflicting aims and objectives, and the in-
terpretation put upon the contract may depend upon which objective is chosen
as the major premise." Id. In an employee's suit alleging breach of ambiguous
contract language, a court is hard pressed to find a fundamental purpose gov-
erning the contract language counter to the interpretation urged by both the
employer and the union.
Furthermore, the fact that the contract language is ambiguous may imply
one of two situations-either the parties did not agree upon a specific policy be-
cause the issue was never considered, or the issue was considered but the par-
ties could not agree upon a specific policy and they intended to leave the issue
open to further negotiation when it arose. See Summers, supra note 9, at 390.
If the former is true, it would be an abuse of the court's authority to impose on
the parties contract terms to which they never agreed. If the latter is true, it
would be an abuse of the court's authority to interpret the contract contrary to
the intention that the issue be left open for further negotiation. Hence, the en-
tire exercise of divining a fixed intent from ambiguous contract language con-
trary to an interpretation the collective parties have subsequently chosen is ill
advised.
These problems are not present, however, when the contract language is
clear. If a court has clear, specific language to guide it, the court cannot be ac-
cused of reordering the scheme agreed upon by the private parties; it merely
enforces the terms the parties initially set. Thus, the rule that judicial involve-
ment should depend on the specificity of the contract language maintains the
appropriate relational balance between courts and parties to collective bargain-
ing agreements. As Professor Summers has observed, under this rule, the col-
lective parties, rather than individuals, retain the dominant role in completing
the terms of the agreement. Id at 390, 396.
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union discretion can be illustrated by an example of clear and
unambiguous terms which grant a benefit to a minority group.
In an industry subject to periodic layoffs, the collective bargain-
ing agreement would conceivably contain a clause providing for
partial layoff of all employees in case of a plant slowdown.
High seniority employees may have been persuaded to accept
this clause in exchange for a contract clause providing a
steeply sloped wage scale. Under this quid pro quo, high sen-
iority employees receive a sufficiently high wage that they are
willing to accept an occasional partial layoff. Correspondingly,
low seniority employees may be willing to accept a low wage
scale in exchange for greater job security, since they would be
guaranteed partial employment in the case of a plant
slowdown.
Assume further that the employer failed to follow the con-
tract language and placed one third of its most junior employ-
ees on-total layoff. These employees would be required first to
seek remedies in the grievance/arbitration process. The major-
ity of the employees would favor the changed layoff policy. The
union, therefore, may be tempted to derail the grievance at the
urging of the majority. According the union the discretion to
change the terms of the contract by allowing it to terminate the
grievance would result in giving the majority an unfair advan-
tage at the expense of the minority. The majority, consisting of
more senior employees, would receive the double benefit of
higher wages and job security at a double cost to the minority,
in contravention of the express terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and the bargain struck between the employee
groups. Not only would this result in an unfair distribution of
tangible benefits, but it would greatly undermine the confi-
dence of the minority in collective bargaining and griev-
ance/arbitration as. means of obtaining fair working conditions.
c. An Application of the Fair Process Model to Contract
Interpretation
Among the conflicting cases dealing with employee conflict
of interest in grievance processing, Smith v. Hussmann Refrig-
eration Co.157 appears to follow the fair process model. In
157. 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980). The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached
a similar decision in Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.IL 332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975), cert
denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976). The union in Belanger arbitrated the case of a
teacher with more seniority who was passed over for promotion in favor of a
teacher with less seniority under a modified seniority clause, similar to the
clause in Hussmann. The union convinced the arbitrator that the two teachers
had equal qualifications and that under the contract, the senior teacher was en-
1134 [Vol. 67:1079
FAIR REPRESENTATION DUTY
Hus=mann the contract language structured the employer's
promotion decisions.158 The applicable contract language pro-
vided that the company should consider the factors of seniority,
skill, and ability in making promotions, but "[w]here skill and
ability to perform are substantially equal, seniority shall gov-
ern."U59 The company promoted four employees based on their
superior skill and ability. Grievances were filed by other em-
ployees, who were passed over for promotion but who were se-
nior to those employees whom the company had promoted.
The union chose to support the grievants' claims solely because
of their seniority and pressed the grievances to arbitration. In
choosing to support these grievants, the union never evaluated
the skill of the employees who had been promoted, even
though the grievances' merits depended upon the potential
candidates being substantially equal in skill and ability to
those employees promoted by the employer. When the arbitra-
tion award eventually resulted in two of the more senior em-
ployees receiving the jobs of two of those who had been
promoted initially, the latter two brought suit against the em-
ployer and the union.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
issued two different opinions on the matter. The first opin-
ion,160 decided by a panel of three judges, addressed the ques-
tion squarely under the analysis of this Article. It held that the
union had erred in failing to take into account the merits of the
grievance under the contract language. In the second opinion,
titled to the promotion. Belanger, the junior teacher, was deprived of his pro-
motion and ified a grievance that the union understandably refused to
arbitrate. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the union had breached
its duty by aligning itself with the senior teacher without investigating both
claims and comparing qualifications. The court said that the union's right to
take a position between two members of the bargaining unit must be "based on
its good-faith judgment as to the merits of the conflicting claims." Id. at 343, 346
A.2d at 132.
One commentator criticizes the decision in Hussmann, urging that the
union should have the same degree of flexibility it has in contract negotiation
whenever it is faced with a grievance decision to support one group of employ-
ees at the expense of another, because it should be permitted to prefer the col-
lective good to the individual good. See Comment, Fair Representation in the
Arbitration of Grievances-The Eighth Circuit Adds Another Straw, 47 TENN. L
Rav. 631, 640-43 (1980). The problem with this position is that it ignores the fact
that grievance decisions are particularly susceptible to majority attempts to
reap an unbargained for benefit from the employer and shift the costs to a mi-
nority or an individual.
158. 619 F.2d at 1233 n.4.
159. Id.




issued after the court agreed to rehear the issue en banc,161 the
court reiterated its original reasoning that the jury could
properly find that the union breached its duty of fair represen-
tation by failing to follow the contract language requiring skill
and ability to be taken into account. This time, however, the
court broadened its ruling by suggesting alternative grounds on
which the jury could reasonably have found against the union:
that the union failed to take the plaintiffs' interests into ac-
count and did not allow them to participate in the decisionmak-
ing, a line of reasoning which is also consistent with the fair
process model.162 Despite the alternative holdings, the initial
ground clearly received the most attention from the court.16
The court stated, "In a [seniority dispute] the union must fairly
represent both groups of employees and may take a position in
favor of one group only on the basis of an informed, reasoned
judgment regarding the merits of the claims in terms of the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreement.' 1"6 The court
recognized the difficulty thrust upon the union when it prefers
one group of employees over another. Since employees are not
all similarly situated, a union must be able to make legitimate
differentiations. Liability should not be imposed on a union be-
cause of mere differences of opinion in line drawing. Neverthe-
less, when the employees' interests directly conflict, the union's
decision must not be made arbitrarily, which, as the court indi-
cated, would seem to require an informed, reasoned judgment
of the merits of the claims. 65
In analyzing the language of the contract, the court stated:
Under the collective bargaining agreement, after the company chose to
select on the basis of merit, three separate considerations were rele-
vant in determining the right of any employee to be promoted. These
were (1) his selection by the company, (2) on the basis of skill and
161. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigeration Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980).
162. The court held that 1) the jury could properly have found that the
union's failure to notify plaintiffs of the arbitration hearing or to invite them to
attend the hearing was a breach of the duty of fair representation, id. at 1241;
2) the jury could have found that the union's resubmission of the issue to the
arbitrator, after he had initially determined seniority, violated the collective
bargaining agreement's provision of arbitration finality, id. at 1242; and 3) the
jury could have found that the union's failure to accept plaintiffs' counter griev-
ances after the first grievance decision was finalized was a breach of the duty of
fair representation, id. at 1243.
163. Only three of the eight judges sitting agreed to this position. Judge
Lay seemed to follow a bad faith standard and concurred with the majority on
another ground, and Judges Bright and Ross also concurred on other alterna-
tive grounds. Judges Heaney and Stephenson dissented. Id. at 1246-54.
164. Id. at 1237 (emphasis added).
165. The court indicated, however, that it did not mean to require a union to
hold internal hearings on the merits of every grievance. Id. at 1240.
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ability, (3) superior to the skill and ability of any senior employee who
had bid for the position. Disregard for the qualification of superior skill
and ability could manifest an arbitrary and perfunctory approach to
promotion interests .... 166
Presumably, had the contract failed to specify the factors on
which the promotion was to be based,167 the union would have
been free to base its decision on any single rational factor or
combination of factors including seniority alone. In that case,
the union's decision to follow the principle of seniority in chal-
lenging the employer's action would have been reasonable and
within its discretion.
The court also expressed concern that failing to follow the
contract language, by adhering to a policy of processing griev-
ances solely on the basis of seniority, "would effectively set
aside a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. 'Such
cavalier treatment of the contract is scarcely consistent with
the contemplation of the parties and seems contrary to the
union members' understanding and expectations when they
ratified the contract.' "168
The other ground which the court found sufficient for a
finding of breach of the duty of fair representation was the
union's exclusion of the plaintiffs from the decisionmaking pro-
cess. 6 9 The court found two separate instances of this exclu-
sion. The union failed to notify the plaintiffs of the time or
place of the arbitration hearing, and after the adverse arbitra-
tion decision, the union refused to accept new grievances filed
by the plaintiffs. The court held that either instance could be a
proper basis for finding a breach. The court seemed to suggest
166. Id. at 1239.
167. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), in which the contract
failed to specify on what basis seniority disputes should be resolved.
168. 619 F.2d at 1240-41 (quoting Summers, supra note 13, at 264).
The Eighth Circuit has not been alone in drawing the line of union arbitrar-
iness based on the union's adherence to specific contract language. In Verner
v. Butcher's Union No. 127, Nos. 79-4388 and 79-4389 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981), the Ninth Circuit indicated approval of the Huss-
mann doctrine. The court stated that Hussmann teaches that the union should
support those employees whose position is substantiated by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. In Verner, the union's actions of favoring one
group over another in a seniority dispute were upheld because the plain mean-
ing of the contract supported the position advanced by the union. See also
Heider Jeep Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2956 (NJ). Ohio 1977) (refusal to process
a seniority grievance did not constitute a breach when the contract and a modi-
fication of the contract supported the union's action); Gratien v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 68 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,628 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (withdrawal of senior-
ity grievance just prior to arbitration did not constitute a breach when the con-
tract language and a previous arbitration decision favored the union's
decision).
169. 619 F.2d at 1241, 1243.
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that the purpose of giving the affected employees the opportu-
nity to attend the arbitration hearing was to ensure their views
would be presented to the arbitrator, since the union had not
considered those views. Certainly, as the court states, a fair ar-
bitration hearing would have cured earlier defects of union rep-
resentation.170 It is unlikely, however, that the court would
require all affected parties to have the opportunity to attend
the arbitration hearing if the union takes into account their
views at an earlier stage.
Although it is difficult to articulate a uniform rule outlining
the requisite extent of the opportunity to participate, the facts
of this case indicate that the union systematically excluded the
interests of the junior employees who had been promoted to
the contested position. The union failed to interview them in
order to make a deliberation on the merits, failed to notify
them of the arbitration on a decision which would affect their
job interests, refused to accept their grievance filed after the ar-
bitration decision had affected their interests, and finally, re-
fused their request to address the membership on the issue.
Thus, the court appears to have been motivated by the same
notions of policy that underlie the fair process model: the
union should in most cases follow clear contract language, but
if it must depart from the language it must not shut affected
employees out of the process of union decisionxnaking.
2. A Special Case: Plant Closings
The foregoing section argued that the clear, unambiguous
language of collective bargaining agreements should, for the
most part, establish the boundaries of union discretion in griev-
ance processing, even when the interests of employees conflict.
This conclusion is based on the view that contract language
may reflect interemployee agreements on how to allocate
scarce resources. In the case of unforeseen circumstances,
such as a plant closing caused by an unanticipated change of
market forces, however, wider union discretion may be justified
and necessary. The interests of all workers are served by
granting the union the power to reopen the contract to scale
down employee benefits, since each employee stands to benefit
from the continuation of the enterprise. This is precisely the
type of exigent circumstance in which individual entitlements
may need to yield to greater collective interests.17' Even if
union concessions cannot preserve the enterprise, this ex-
170. Id. at 1241 n.13.
171. See supra note 138.
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traordinary change in circumstances can justify setting aside
interemployee agreements on the allocation of benefits.17
2 Of
course, if a plant closing has been anticipated and provided for
by clear contract language, the provision for the contingency
militates against the need for wider union discretion and in
favor of protecting employee expectations created by that
language.
17 3
In the plant closing setting, the union should have the
power to set aside interemployee deals reflected in the original
contract because employees presumably would have negotiated
a different benefit package had they known the plant closing
was pending. A contract negotiated on the assumption that the
enterprise will continue indefinitely will usually include a
mixed package of immediate and future benefits. To obtain
some future benefit, such as vacation time or pension benefits,
the union presumably had to relinquish some immediate bene-
fit, such as higher wages.174 The receipt of that future benefit,
however, is dependent upon the plant's continued operation
until the time the benefits become due. Thus, if the union an-
ticipated the plant closing at the time it negotiated the contract,
it would no doubt choose to forgo future benefits for a larger
package of immediately available benefits. Holding the union
172. See supra text accompanying notes 146-56. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979): "Where, after a contract is made, a
party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the oc-
currence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."
173. See Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus. Inc., 544 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1976) (no
breach when union and employer amended pension plan in anticipation of
plant closing and contract provided for modification of the pension plan and
plant closing), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977); Bowlin v. Auto. Workers, 66 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 11,923 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), (no breach when union negotiated
change in severance pay in anticipation of plant closing); Ferrara v. Pacific In-
termountain Express Co., 301 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (contract established
guidelines for the determination of seniority in the event of an acquisition
based on alternative classifications of "buy-out" or "merger").
174. For example, employees approaching retirement may trade lower pres-
ent wages for higher pension benefits, which can only be realized upon retire-
ment. If these employees had known that they would not be able to retire as
expected because of the plant closing, they probably would have pressed for
and obtained a package consisting of higher present wages or partial retire-
ment benefits.
If wage increases for higher seniority employees received support from
lower seniority employees expecting eventually to move into the higher senior-
ity classification, the low seniority employees probably would have withdrawn
their support for the contract term had they known that the plant would close
before they would receive the benefit of the term. Thus, it is reasonable to as-
sume that since the majorities that formed over particular contract benefits




to clear contract terms in this circumstance may result in a for-
tuitous allocation of available benefits, since those employees
with still pending benefits will be unable to receive them.
Because employer actions pursuant to partial or complete
closings are likely to trigger grievance claims, the scaling down
of benefits frequently occurs in the context of grievance
processing.17 5 In negotiating new arrangements, there is again
the risk that a majority-influenced union may take undue ad-
vantage of a minority. As long as the union waives only those
contract terms that affect all employees equally, 7 6 or that af-
175. See, e.g., Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980). The employer's willingness to renegotiate with the
union may depend on whether the employer anticipates a partial or temporary
closing or a complete closing. If the employer anticipates only a partial closing,
it may seek the union's continued cooperation, and it may be willing to amend
the contract and thus allow greater participation by minority groups in negoti-
ating the outcome.
If the employer decides to close the plant permanently, there is little incen-
tive for the employer to negotiate a contract amendment with the union. Thus,
in certain circumstances the union may choose to use existing contract claims
enforced through the grievance/arbitration procedure as tactical leverage for
negotiating a better settlement, since threatening to take a grievance to arbitra-
tion has a nuisance value similar to threatening to bring suit. See, e.g., Buch-
holtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018
(1980). In these circumstances it would be folly to hold the union to the literal
terms of an existing contract which is predicated on the assumption of a contin-
uing enterprise.
Although the employer is required to bargain in good faith about the effects
of closing under the National Labor Relations Act, the question of whether the
employer must bargain about the decision to terminate part of its operation
and the effects of that decision upon the bargaining unit has created a split be-
tween the courts and the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB has
taken the position that an employer must bargain about both the decision and
its effects. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966). Appellate courts,
however, have repeatedly declined to adopt the Ozark Trailers principle. Re-
cently, the Supreme Court held that in economically motivated partial closure
situations the employer need only bargain about the effects of the closure. See
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The decision to par-
tially terminate the business, the Court concluded, is a managerial prerogative
which overrides any benefits to the bargaining unit derived from a requirement
of bargaining. Id. at 686. For a detailed discussion of First National Mainte-
nance, see Fenton, Partial Closings After First National Maintenance: Legal
Refusals to Bargain Collectively, 1981 ARz. ST. L.J. 865.
176. Essentially, the same situation occurs when the union negotiates some
term of a contract which disadvantages the entire bargaining unit. Professor
Finkin suggests a "rule of thumb" for the union's duty of fair representation in
negotiating-
A question of a departure from the duty of fair representation is not
presented unless there is a disadvantagement of a minority within the
bargaining unit or of an individual where the characteristic of the indi-
vidual's disadvantagement is not shared with the majority. Because
the gravamen of the duty is a limitation on the majority's power over
the minority, the duty does not restrain the power of the majority over
itself. If, for example, a union agrees to an across-the-board reduction
in benefits, or fails to secure severance pay in the event of the plant
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fect employees proportionally on some recognized basis such
as seniority,17 7 no issue of fair representation arises, since an
equal or proportional reduction in benefits should reflect the
benefit allocation that existed under the original contract. In
these cases, the costs of the concessions are equitably distrib-
uted among bargaining unit members. In fact, holding a union
to strict enforcement of clear contract language might result in
greater inequity, especially if that language was adopted on the
employees' assumption of continued operation.
If, instead of waiving benefits on some recognized basis, a
union waives only those contract terms that affect individuals
or minority groups, an issue of fair representation is raised be-
cause the majority may be improving its position by appropriat-
ing additional benefits at the expense of the minority.178 Fair
process does not require shifting the balance in favor of a mi-
nority, but it does establish a minimum procedural require-
ment that affected parties be permitted to protect their
interests by participating in any settlement or liquidation of
contract benefits. Since the justification for reopening the con-
tract is that, if the employees had negotiated with knowledge of
the pending plant closing, they would have sought different
contract terms, any contract readjustment should be accompa-
nied by whatever procedural protections would normally ac-
company contract negotiation.179 This mechanism is superior to
selective grievance enforcement because it enables employees
to arrive at their true preferences by interemployee trading and
is more likely to arrive at an allocation of limited resources that
reflects the employees' true bargaining strength.
Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union
closing, no question of fair representation is presented because the dis-
advantagement is of the majority (in these examples, the entirety) of
the unit.
Finkin, supra note 28, at 210 (italics omitted).
177. See, e.g., Kennan v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 81 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 13,079 (N.D. Cal. 1976). More senior employees can be expected to
have a greater stake in the enterprise. They typically receive more benefits
under existing contracts so it is reasonable for them to receive more benefits in
an adjustment.
178. See Goglowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977)
(modification of seniority rights in partial plant closing by agreement of com-
pany and union).
179. The amendment process could present the same problem of shutting
minorities out of the decisionmaking process if the union, with the employer's
consent, is able selectively to reopen negotiation on certain provisions. In the
partial layoff hypothetical, see supra text accompanying notes 156-57, reopening
negotiations on the wage scale could create a benefit for the majority at the ex-
pense of the minority-the very danger sought to be avoided by restricting the
union's ability to waive contract terms through selective contract enforcement.
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No. 2180 and Battle v. Clark Equipment Co.181 present two ex-
amples in which literal adherence to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreements led to unintended and incongruous re-
sults in cases of unexpected plant closings. In both cases, ad-
justments designed for temporary layoffs were applied in
situations where the layoff became a permanent closing. Since
these plants followed a LIFO (last in, first out) seniority order,
those with the least seniority were the first laid off, and, there-
fore, were able to avail themselves of supplemental unemploy-
ment benefits in Battle and of new employment opportunities
in Ryan to the disadvantage of high seniority employees who
were inevitably laid off at a later date.
In Battle, the collective bargaining agreement provided for
regular weekly benefits payable to any qualified employee who
had been laid off. If the contract had been strictly followed, the
supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) fund would have
been exhausted before the workers with the greatest seniority
were laid off, leaving those who made the greatest contribu-
tions to the fund without any benefits. The union acted by
amending the contract to freeze distribution of benefits under
the old plan and to provide for their distribution on a seniority
basis. Under the union constitution, this amendment was rati-
fied by 90% of those with SUB plan credits and 100% of those
on layoff. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ordered dismissal of the challenger's claim that the
union had acted arbitrarily in proposing the amendment be-
cause the court found that the amendment responded to an in-
equity in a reasonable manner.182
The Seventh Circuit's decision is consistent with the fair
process theory. Faced with a declining labor market, a union
should be able to negotiate a reduction of benefits for all em-
ployees and to allocate remaining benefits based on seniority.
One would expect this redistribution to parallel the former or-
dering of employee rights. Typically, more senior employees
receive greater benefits than less senior employees. On the
new diminished scale, more senior employees would continue
to receive more benefits than less senior employees. Further-
more, the original purpose for including SUB benefits in the
contract was probably based on the premise of a temporary lay-
off. In a continuing enterprise, the fund would later be replen-
ished, perhaps by those same laid-off employees who received
180. 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979).
181. 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978).
182. Id. at 1347-48.
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benefits, when the plant returned to full employment. Here,
however, when the layoff became a permanent plant closing, it
was not an unfair invasion of vested minority expectations to
liquidate the fund's assets on the basis of seniority.183 Further-
more, since the ratification procedure gave full consideration to
the affected minority, they were able to participate fully in the
adjustment decision.
In Ryan, the problem was more complex and the responses
of the union and the court less satisfactory. The Alco plant laid
off employees in four stages. When the first group was laid off,
it was not apparent to the union that the entire plant would
close down. The union responded to the first layoff by issuing a
"freeze order" prohibiting other members from seeking new
jobs and from obtaining seniority at other plants under the
union's jurisdiction until all laid-off employees had found em-
ployment and established seniority. When a second group of
employees was laid off, the union issued a similar freeze order.
When the third group of employees was laid off, it became ap-
parent to the union that a permanent closing was being ef-
fected. The union issued a different order permitting all
remaining employees to establish priority at another plant as of
the date of the order, regardless of whether they were actually
laid off or changed jobs at that time. Although all employees
eventually found new employment, the effect of this sequence
of union orders was to disadvantage the third group of employ-
ees laid off. This group was now at the bottom of the priority
list, although they had been second from the top at Alco. Those
employees laid off first now had top seniority although they had
been lowest at Alco. Those with top seniority at Alco were now
in the middle of the list at their new jobs.184
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found no breach of the union's duty of fair representation,
based on the premise that a union has broad discretion to ad-
just the demands of competing factions if it does not act arbi-
trarily or irrationally.185 The court found that the union's
actions were rational because the union could not foresee the
183. See Kennan v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 81 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
13,079 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (as a result of widespread layoffs, company and union
restricted base trading rights for stewardesses on a rigid seniority basis).
184. The priorities at Alco had been The new priorities were:
56 most senior 12
35 20
20 56
12 least senior 35
185. Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590
F.2d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1979).
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plant closing during the early layoff stages.186 At each stage the
union had acted to protect those employees who appeared to
be the only ones needing reemployment. At the time of the
third layoff, when the union could foresee a complete closing of
the plant, it acted responsibly to preserve the superior position
of the most senior group of employees.
This ruling may have been supported by the premise that it
is unfair to hold a union to a level of prescience only available
on hindsight.187 In this case, however, the court's deference to
union decisionmaking seems unsupported by the policies
which underlie the deference rule. 88 Readjustment of the sen-
iority list to reflect the original seniorities at Alco does not ap-
pear to be the sort of court intrusion against which the doctrine
was designed to protect. Short of reordering the priority list it-
self, the court could have required the union to provide greater
procedural protections by holding an election on the issue of
reordering seniority, since majority rule would probably have
returned the priority order to what it had been at Alco. 8 9
Thus, this case illustrates the value of according employees an
opportunity to express their preferences regarding the redistri-
bution of benefits obtained through the fortuitous timing of
events of a plant closing.
In summary, many grievances involve issues of conflicting
interests between employees. This problem is especially likely
to arise in grievances which require the union to interpret con-
tract language. In these situations the concern is that the bene-
fits that respective groups of employees receive through
contract enforcement reflect their true bargaining strength
within the context of negotiating a contract package. Minorities
or individuals have no right to insist that ambiguous language
be interpreted in their favor. But when the minority has man-
aged, through negotiation and vote trading, to obtain favorable
contract terms in clear and specific language, there should be
some restrictions on the union's power to abandon those
186. Id. at 455-56.
187. See supra text accompanying note 94.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
189. Indeed, it is ironic that the majority pressures within the union did not
return the priority list to right without a lawsuit. Given the numbers, one could
have expected the group of 56 plus 35 to return to the head of the list, displac-
ing the group of 12 and 20 who had formerly had the least seniority at Alco. Al-
though this may attribute to the court greater wisdom than it articulated, the
court may have refused to reorder the priorities on the belief that court inter-
vention is justified only when a majority takes advantage of a minority. In in-




claims. 190 This proposal can be effected by creating a presump-
tion favoring the union's obligation to enforce clear contract
language, a presumption that can be rebutted if the union
presents evidence of exigent circumstances and evidence that
the affected employees have had an opportunity to participate
in any redistribution of benefits.
C. NONADJUDICATiVE REASONS FOR FAING TO ARBITRATE A
GRIEVANCE: CONTRACT INTERPRETATION WHEN THE
INTERESTS OF OTHER EMPLOYEES ARE NOT
DIRECTLY IMPLICATED
The administrative agency analogy for union decisionmak-
ing described in the preceding sections cast the union in an ad-
judicative role, determining the facts and the law of the
contract. The inquiry does not end there, however. A question
remains whether there are any reasons other than a determina-
tion on the grievance's merits which should allow a union to
terminate the grievance. In other words, are there valid
nonadjudicative reasons which justify a union's terminating a
grievance?19 1 One such reason may be a union's limited
financial resources. Another reason may be limited union
strength in terms of bargaining leverage in dealing with the
employer.
1. Limited Financial Resources: Due Process Is Not Cost Free
A union's limited financial resources may be a legitimate
basis for the union's failure to take a grievance to arbitration.
Even after weeding out frivolous and nonmeritorious griev-
ances, a union may find that it has more meritorious grievances
than it can afford to arbitrate. Because the arbitration process
is costly, both in terms of paying the arbitrator and paying for
legal representation,192 the union's financial resources may not
190. A similar result should follow when an employer has violated clear and
specific contract language to the injury of an individual employee even though
the individual may not have had sufficient bargaining strength to have sought
and obtained the favorable contract term alone.
191. For one answer to this question, see Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533
F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the Fifth Circuit held that an action by a
union is not arbitrary if the action is "(1) based upon relevant, permissible
union factors which excludes (sic) the possibility of it being based upon moti-
vations such as personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational result
of consideration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of a fair and impartial con-
sideration of the interests of all employees." See also Seymour v. Olin Corp.,
666 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding, under Tedford, that a union's refusal
to represent a discharged employee because he had hired an attorney was
wrongful because the refusal was based on an irrelevant, impermissible factor).
192. Costs include "the time and expense of the participants, and the inves-
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allow it to arbitrate every meritorious grievance filed. To a lim-
ited extent, the union has some control over its financial ability
to arbitrate grievances. The union can increase its financial re-
source base by passing the costs on to union members in the
form of increased dues. The union can also attempt to negoti-
ate contract terms that pass a greater portion of arbitration
costs on to the employer.
Nonetheless, limited financial resources may force a union
to choose between grievances.193 For the sake of illustration,
assume that a union has two meritorious grievances to process.
If the arbitration is successful, grievance A will benefit one em-
ployee, whereas grievance B will benefit several employees. If
the union can afford to arbitrate only one of the grievances, the
union may choose to pursue the grievance which is of greater
interest to the members of its bargaining unit. The union may
decide which grievance is of greater interest on several differ-
ent bases. If the union decides that greater interest is deter-
mined by the number of employees affected, it may prefer
grievance B. If however, the benefit to be obtained by arbitrat-
ing grievance B is less significant than that of grievance A, L94
the union may prefer grievance A. By deciding not to arbitrate
one of the grievances, the union may be inviting a suit by the
grievants whose claims are terminated. Certainly, the union
cannot be faulted for attempting to allocate its scarce financial
resources to obtain the contract enforcement which is of maxi-
mum interest to the members of its bargaining unit.195 But
neither can the employee be faulted for attempting to enforce a
meritorious grievance that has been abandoned solely because
of lack of union finances. 96
A possible solution to the problem would be to allow the
employee to pay the union's costs of arbitration.197 Certainly,
tigation of facts." One must also take into account secretaries and copying
costs, and, with increasing regularity, the cost of a transcript. D. ROTHscmu,
L. MERRIELD & H. EDWARDS, COLLECTrvE BARGAIUNG AND LABOR ARBrrRATION
220 (1979).
193. Some commentators have expressed opinions on how the union should
trade off various job interests. See supra note 57.
194. For example, grievance A is a discharge case, and grievance B is a mat-
ter of a few hours of overtime.
195. See, e.g., Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 658, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
196. See Virgilio v. French J. Hecht Corp., No. 79-67-D-2 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 20,
1979) (Where union encouraged employee to sue in court on what union be-
lieved to be meritorious grievance but union was unable to afford arbitration
costs, failure to allege breach of duty of fair representation held to be bar to
suit.).
197. [U]nion members may refuse to assess themselves dues sufficient
to arbitrate even substantial grievances. However, it is one thing for a
union to declare an inability or unwillingness to process a meritorious
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an employee who is willing to face the litigation costs involved
in pursuing the matter would be willing to bear the financial
cost the union would incur in arbitrating the claim. Under this
solution, neither the union nor the grievant would be worse off.
The union would be better off because it would not find itself
cast as a possible defendant in a section 301 suit, but instead it
would be aligned with the employee in presenting the griev-
ance. Moreover, since arbitration is preferable to litigation, 98
the integrity of the system would be protected from undue
court interference. The only party who might complain is the
employer, but it is not certain that the employer would be dis-
advantaged. Although the employer would be better off if the
grievance was terminated and it did not need to defend itself in
arbitration, if the employee would sue the employer anyway,
the employer may be better off in arbitration than defending in
court. More important, the employer, as the party that alleg-
edly breached the contract, has no legitimate interest in avoid-
ing arbitration based on the union's finances. 99 This proposal
could be effected by allowing grievants to arbitrate if they pay
the costs whenever the union's sole reason for not arbitrating a
grievance is financial cost.2 0o
2. Limited Strategic Resources: The Analogy to Strike
Decisions
Aside from financial cost, a union may have another reason
grievance and quite another thing for a union to bar the individual
from processing.it on his own behalf. The union's exclusive control
over grievances is not one imposed on the union by the statute, but is
one voluntarily assumed by the union under the contract.
Summers, supra note 13, at 273-74. Professor Summers argued in favor of al-
lowing individual grievants to bear the costs of arbitrating grievances which the
union had rejected. He reasoned that placing the financial burden on individu-
als would serve to discourage the union's pursuit of favorable claims or those
claims whose net gain was less than the cost of arbitration. He also dispelled
the fear that the employer would be harassed by litigious employees by observ-
ing that the financial burden on the individual is relatively greater than that on
the employer and that few employees will challenge the combined forces of
union and management. Regardless of whether Professor Summers is correct
on this point, the suggestion proposed here affects a smaller number of griev-
ances: those in which the union's only reason for rejecting the grievances is
the financial cost of arbitration. See also Summers, supra note 9, at 403-04.
198. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
199. For a general discussion of the employer's interest in the griev-
ance/arbitration process, see supra notes 17, 156.
200. Cf. Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971), affig
316 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (union's offer to request arbitration of a griev-
ance if the employee would pay expenses was not a breach of the duty of fair
representation when the chance of success was highly speculative).
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unrelated to the grievance's merits for blocking the employee's
access td arbitration. If the grievance is arguably meritorious
and does not directly jeopardize interests of other employees,
the grievant may argue that the union must arbitrate the griev-
ance because it has nothing at risk and there is a chance that
the arbitrator will rule in the grievant's favor.20 1 At first glance,
it might appear that the union should be obligated to do so,
since the individual's interest is not offset by a countervailing
collective interest. The union's decision not to arbitrate a
claim, however, may be based on its desire to conserve another
limited resource for the collective interest: bargaining
leverage.202
All grievances have a nuisance value which the union can
either impose on or remove from the employer. Thus, the deci-
sion whether to arbitrate a claim may be influenced by the
union's desire to exert leverage on the employer.203 Leverage
behavior is most apparent in the union's use of the collective
strike. Although the nuisance to the employer of arbitrating a
claim is not nearly as great as the nuisance of a strike, the anal-
ysis of union strategy is similar.
When strikes were the major means of contract enforce-
ment, a union could not call a strike, or even threaten to strike,
each time an individual employee or minority group claimed
that the employer had breached the contract. The costs of a
strike to the union and its members were far too high to war-
rant more than occasional use of this ultimate leverage device.
Furthermore, the effective use of the strike depended on care-
ful timing and selective use. The strike was the union's ulti-
mate weapon, but to maintain credibility with the employer the
union could threaten to strike only sparingly.204
As a means of contract enforcement, strikes depend on lev-
erage in much the same way that contract negotiation depends
upon leverage. What a union can negotiate, as well as what it
201. See Summers, supra note 13, at 274.
202. Maximizing leverage implies that the union can selectively choose
which grievances to arbitrate. Use of the grievance process as a leverage tactic
and a tool for negotiation is discussed in Feller, supra note 17, at 743-44.
203. Some arbitrators have observed that prior to the period for negotiation
of a new contract, the number of grievances fied rises, only to be settled once
the new contract is signed.
204. [T] he union can hardly afford an all out strike every time it feels
that a grievance has been unjustly denied. The consequence is either
that unadjusted grievances are accumulated until there is an explosion,
or that groups of workers, less than the entirety, resort to job action,
small stoppages, slowdowns, or careless workmanship to force adjust-
ment of their grievances.
Shulman, supra note 143, 1007.
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can enforce, depends upon the group's collective power backed
by group action through selective striking. In the strike model
of contract enforcement, it is inconceivable that a court would
interfere to tell a union to use its muscle to enforce contract
terms favoring a minority.205
The shift away from strikes toward arbitration as the pre-
dominant means of contract enforcement, however, effected a
change in the model for union behavior as well as in the scope
of the duty of fair representation. Compelling arbitration, al-
though not cost free, does not impose as great a cost on either
the employer or the union and the members of its bargaining
unit as does calling a strike. Although arbitration originally
was conceived of as a substitute for strikes,206 the trend of
court decisions and worker expectations has been to view arbi-
tration as a substitute for judicial determination. 20 7 Strikes and
judicial determinations, as different analogues for arbitration,
have had different influences on the evolution of the standard
for union behavior in grievance processing. The question then
is what remaining role leverage should play in a union's deci-
sion not to enforce a grievance. More particularly, the concern
is whether the two reasoning processes produce different out-
comes in terms of whether grievances should be arbitrated.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that a union
can compel arbitration solely for the purpose of exerting bar-
205. Since the duty of fair representation developed in this context, it is not
surprising that originally the scope of the duty was limited to proscribing sub-
jective discrimination. The only conduct courts sanctioned was a union's with-
holding its collective voice and power from minority groups in its bargaining
unit based on discrimination or bad faith.
206. In collective bargaining agreements, the no strike clause promised by
unions was considered the quid pro quo for the employer's promise to submit
unsettled grievances to binding arbitration. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
207. The degree to which the arbitration process involves many of the at-
tributes of judicial procedure is noted in Feller, supra note 17, at 743. Evidence
of the shift can be found in the increasing concern for due process in arbitra-
tion proceedings. See Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Proce-
dure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1961); Rabin, supra note 92, at
84; Symposium, Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government-A "State Ac-
tion" Analysis, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 4 (1968); Comment, Industrial Due Processes
and Just Cause for Discipline: A Comparative Analysis of the Arbitral and Ju-
dicial Decisional Processes, 6 U.CJ.-. L, REv. 603 (1959). This change may
have come about due to the courts' recasting of arbitration as a means of dis-
pute resolution in their own image. See, e.g., Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d
574, 580 n.28 (3d Cir. 1968) (court suggested that a key factor in deciding
whether the employee had received fair treatment in the grievance procedure
prior to arbitration was the grievance machinery's operational resemblance to
judicial adjudication). See also Local Lodge 1426, Machinists Union v. Wilson
Trailers, 289 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Iowa 1980) (court stated that union had right to
sue as well as right to strike because of absence of arbitration provision).
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gaining leverage on the employer, 08 a union's desire to refrain
from exerting leverage may not be a sufficient justification for
deciding to abandon a grievance. The case law on this point is
not well developed.209 The use or conservation of leverage also
presents the troublesome problem of the practice of trading
grievances. Although a union may justifiably forgo a "nonmeri-
torious grievance" in exchange for an employer concession on
another issue without disadvantaging the grievant,210 trading
away grievances that are "arguably meritorious" may disadvan-
tage employee-grievants because of the possibility that, if arbi-
trated, their grievances would have yielded benefits.
There are some definite advantages in allowing a union to
conserve leverage by trading grievances, however. A leverage
decision is essentially one of resource allocation, and the union
has a limited amount of leverage with which to influence the
employer. Moreover, the union may wisely anticipate that, as a
208. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
209. The principal cases on union leverage trading are Buchholtz v. Swift &
Co., 609 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Harrison v.
United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976); Local 13, Int'l Longshoremen's & Workers' Union v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971).
210. Although the employee has no right to insist on arbitration of a non-
meritorious grievance, the union can use the nuisance value of a worthless
grievance to obtain additional benefits for other employees. In keeping with
the idea that trading meritorious grievances is "arbitrary" behavior, Professor
Summer has said.
The Union's violation of its duty in these cases is that its decision to
surrender the individual's grievance was not based on a judgment of
the merits of the grievance. If a union, after full investigation and fair
consideration, decides that a grievance is not worth carrying to arbitra-
tion, then in such a case there would be no unfairness to the individual
employee in its trading surrender of his grievance for whatever
favorable settlements of other grievances it might persuade the em-
ployer to give.
Summers, supra note 13, at 271. See Miller v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 95
LR.M. (BNA) 2871 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (grievance trading agreement upheld
when the claim was clearly nonmeritorious and the decision was made in good
faith); Heider v. Jeep Corp., 96 L.RR.M. (BNA) 2871 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (grievance
trading agreement upheld when the claim was clearly nonmeritorious and the
decision was made in good faith); Heider v. Jeep Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2956
(ND. Ohio 1977) (grievance trading agreement not a breach when it was part of
the department-wide settlement of a seniority dispute to which the grievant
agreed).
One would expect courts to be hesitant about approving a union's action to
trade one employee's grievance for another because it is abhorrent to the litiga-
tion concept of representation. One would expect a court in order to sidestep
the issue to be quick to characterize the traded grievance as nonmeritorious.
See, e.g., Local 13, Intl Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n., 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971);
Simberlund v. Long Island RIR Co., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970) (union with-
drew employee's claim on determination that it would lose at Railroad Adjust-
ment Board level in exchange for wage increase for all employees).
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practical matter, it will not be able to persuade the arbitrator to
accept a pro-employee interpretation of the contract in every
grievance. If the same arbitrator is chosen to arbitrate all griev-
ances, and for reasons of consistency in contract interpretation
this is likely to be the case, the arbitrator may attempt to even
out the win-loss record of the employer and union in close
cases. The arbitrator may not even be conscious of this prac-
tice, but by evening out the record in close cases, the arbitrator
may promote better industrial relations and ensure his or her
own credibility as a fair decisionmaker in the eyes of the par-
ties. 21 ' Obviously, not all close cases are of equal importance
to either the employer or the union. The uncertainty of win-
ning any particular grievance and the knowledge that, in close
cases, each party has roughly a fifty-fifty chance of prevailing
may induce the parties to negotiate, to ensure that each party
wins those grievances most important to it. The negotiation
will result in offers to trade away those grievances in which
each party has a lesser interest for those in which each has a
greater interest. Trading grievances not only conserves lever-
age, it may also build a basis of agreement, cooperation, and
good will between the employer and the union. Thus, the
union has much to gain from being able to trade grievances.
But despite these advantages, is the practice of trading
grievances fair to the employees whose grievances are traded
away? Even as the union is making a decision about how to al-
locate its leverage, it is important that the union consider the
grievance's likelihood of success, which makes it essential that
the union consider the grievance's merits. Clearly, a union
should be able to trade nonmeritorious grievances because the
grievant is not injured by such a trade. By definition, even if
arbitrated, these grievances yield no benefits to employees.
Unions should not, however, be able to trade grievances they
perceive as meritorious because that would effect a redistribu-
tion of benefits, most likely from an individual or minority to
the dominant group. The real issue then is whether grievances
whose merits fall in the grey area between clearly meritorious
and nonmeritorious should be treated more like one or the
other for purposes of union discretion to trade.
Several policies favor treating these arguably meritorious
grievances as within the union's discretion to trade, provided
that affected grievants have the opportunity to make their case
to the union. Absent clear language, a grievant has no right to
211. It could be noted that by balancing the union and employer successes
the arbitrator may also ensure his or her continued employment as arbitrator.
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expect uniqn enforcement. 212 Since this type of grievance by
definition cannot be deemed to yield a benefit to the grievant
with any degree of certainty, factors other than merit, such as
the importance of the grievance to the grievant or the prece-
dential value to the group should be taken into account. Since
the particular industrial policy is not set in clear and unambig-
uous terms, the union and the employer should be entitled to
fill in gaps in the contract.213 Even though the grievance is only
arguably meritorious, however, the employee should be ac-
corded the opportunity to present his or her case to the union
because the grievant may be able to persuade the union of the
grievance's importance and that factors other than the griev-
ance's merits favor arbitration. 14 Therefore, since this ration-
ale underscores the importance of a union initially determining
the merits of a grievance, union adjudication and union lever-
age are not necessarily inconsistent methods of
decisionmaking.
What case law there is on the issue of grievance trading ap-
pears to follow this analysis. Several courts have maintained
the distinction between "clearly meritorious" grievances and
grievances that are only "arguably meritorious."215 Sometimes
courts have evaluated this union conduct by discussing
whether the trade of a clearly meritorious grievance constitutes
bad faith.216 Whether the courts sanction the trading of griev-
212. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Cronin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir.
1978).
214. Another factor that may be related to whether an "arguably meritori-
ous" grievance is traded is whether the grievance is a fact dispute or a question
of contract interpretation of general applicability. Trading issues of general ap-
plicability does not pose the same problem of inflicting a disproportionate cost
on an individual as trading discharge cases does. For a discussion of the impor-
tance to the grievant as a basis for determining which grievances should be ar-
bitrated, see supra note 57.
215. In a pre-Vaca article, Professor Rosen warned about substituting pub-
lic for private ordering if the courts exercise too much substantive supervision
over the merits of collective bargaining decisions. He also argued that there
can be a very broad range of judicial opinion as to whether a particular ag-
grieved individual's right is sufficiently clear under the existing collective
agreement to warrant enforcement. Rosen, supra note 28, at 424. However,
Professor Rosen's alternative suggestion-that individuals with nonfrivolous
grievances, irrespective of whether the claim asserted is under clear or under
ambiguous provisions of the contract, be permitted to appear and participate in
grievance and arbitrational processes-was clearly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Vaca. See also Rosen, The Individual Workers in Grievance Arbitra-
tion: Still Another Look at The Problem, 24 MD. L. REv. 233, 241-44 (1964).
216. Generally, courts have considered whether this conduct breaches the
union's duty of fair representation by discussing whether a union's failure to
consider the merits constitutes bad faith. In Local 13, Int'l Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.), cert.
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ances under the heading of "bad faith" or of "arbitrariness" is
not as significant as the fact that courts appear to be using an
"objective" standard to define "bad faith," by distinguishing be-
tween trading meritorious grievances and trading grievances,
which are only arguably meritorious, finding the former but not
the latter to fall into the category of bad faith and to be evi-
dence of breach of the duty.
D. AN APPLiCATION OF THEORY IN A COMPLEX CASE
Buchholtz v. Swift & Co. 2 17 illustrates many of the
problems discussed in the preceding sections. On November
29, 1969, the employer closed its packing plant and announced
that no vacation benefits would be given for service in 1969,
since the contract provided that in order to receive vacation
benefits, employees must be on the active payroll as of Decem-
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit said, "We agree ... that a breach of the duty of fair representation
would not be established merely by proof that the International union
'swapped' a concession [on one grievance for another]. In this practical world
such issues, susceptible of no absolutely 'right' solution, are often resolved by
accommodation." Id. at 1067. The court justified such an accommodation by
the existence of a conflict of interests between employees. Noting that the
union's trading of interests must be constrained by good faith, the court stated
that the "swap" would support two inferences: either 1) that "it was a good-
faith choice between interpretations of two provisions of the contract," or
2) that the union, "actuated in part by hostility toward [the grievant], elected
to sacrifice him for a favorable outcome on the [other issue]." Id. Although
there was some evidence of union hostility toward the grievant, the court al-
lowed that the trade would itself be sufficient to constitute a breach even with-
out other evidence of bad faith. "If the International agreed to an
interpretation patently lacking in merit, this in itself might be evidence that its
representation was unfair." Id. at 1067-68, n.10. "What we hold is that a union
may not agree with an employer, either expressly or tacitly, to exchange a meri-
torious grievance of an individual employee for some other supposed benefit."
Id. at 1068 n.11 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Harrison v. United Transportation Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit stated,
[W]e think that the evidence indicates that Harrison's grievance may
have had merit. This does not establish that the union's failure to
press the grievance was a failure to represent him fairly, but proof of a
grievance's merit is circumstantial evidence that the failure to process
the claim constituted bad faith.
Id. at 561. The court indicated that the jury could have found the union's con-
duct to be arbitrary based on a memorandum indicating that the grievant's
claim was relinquished in exchange for another grievance.
This analysis is consistent with the theory that the "good faith" perform-
ance limitation in contract law prevents the party charged with good faith from
attempting to recapture foregone opportunities because such conduct harms
the expectation interest of the dependent party. See Burton, Breach of Con-
tract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV.
369 (1980).
217. 609 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
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ber 28 of the calendar year for which vacation benefits are
claimed. The employees filed a grievance alleging that the De-
cember 28 date was chosen solely for administrative purposes
and that, since they had worked eleven of the twelve months,
they were entitled to some vacation benefits. Moreover, the
employees alleged that the employer had timed, the closing spe-
cifically to avoid paying vacation benefits. The question was
one of contract interpretation. The union processed the claim
and requested arbitration of the matter. Before arbitration
took place, however, the employer announced it was closing a
second plant. In prearbitration meetings, the union agreed to
drop the vacation pay grievance of the employees of the first
plant in exchange for additional pension benefits for employees
of the second plant. The employees of the first plant sued the
union and the employer for their vacation benefits.
Because of the unanticipated nature of the closing of both
plants, the union could have argued that greater flexibility was
needed to readjust the benefits provided under the contracts.
This situation differs from the closing cases discussed ear-
lier,218 however, because, here, the union did not attempt to
scale down employee benefits across the board. Nor did the
union follow procedures to allow employees to participate in
adjusting the benefits. In this particular case, the employees of
the first plant were not even notified in advance of the pro-
posed trade, not to mention being denied a chance to partici-
pate in the decision. The effect of the union's settlement was to
benefit the employees of the second plant at the expense of the
employees of the first plant.
In light of the unanticipated closing, the union should not
have been held to strict enforcement of the contract, but if the
union were to readjust benefits, it should have followed a deci-
sionmaking process that would have assured full participation
of both plants' employees. The procedural protection accorded
by ensuring participation is valuable because of the chance
that it may lead to a more satisfactory substantive result and
because of the assurance it gives affected parties that their in-
terests are being taken into account. Much of the concern
about the union's conduct in Buchholtz arose because the
group advantaged by the trade was completely isolated from
the group disadvantaged. Had some sort of ratification proce-
dure been followed, one might have expected majority rule to
produce an accommodation between the two groups, such as
218. See supra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
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trading off vacation pay for pension benefits that could be oper-
ative at both plants or compromising both claims in order to ob-
tain partial vacation pay and partial pension benefits.
219
Allowing vote trading to take place on both issues would have
gained more approval because the losers on one issue could
have been partially compensated by gains on the other. The
majority would determine its highest priority, but if no discrete
majority emerged, one might observe minorities capturing
some benefit in exchange for their support of the trade. Al-
though a voting procedure might have arrived at the same re-
sult,220 following an employee voting procedure would have
proven that this result was the maximum benefit for the largest
number of employees and would have assured each group that
their interests were being taken into account.
In a split decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, all three positions taken reflect differing
appraisals of the merits of the underlying grievance. The ma-
jority and concurring opinions took the position that the vaca-
tion pay grievance either was not meritorious at all, or was at
best only arguably meritorious.221 The majority opinion en-
dorsed the validity of the trade by highlighting the benefits the
union had obtained for the employees of the second plant.
22 2
In contrast, the dissent considered the vacation pay grievance
meritorious.223 While the dissent acknowledged that unions
have discretion to trade claims in good faith, the dissent found
that this particular trade was not in good faith because the
union believed the plaintiffs' claim to be meritorious and
traded it for benefits for other workers without notifying the
plaintiffs. 4
Under the leverage trading analysis, if one accepts the as-
sumption that the grievance was at best only arguably meritori-
ous, then the union should be entitled to trade it away to
ensure the success of the more important grievance. Even
219. The union may have perceived some tactical advantage in selective
contract enforcement over contract amendment. Even if the grievance machin-
ery is used for tactical advantage, however, the determination of which griev-
ances to pursue should be open to employee participation, which could lead to
an equitable distribution of the burden of the closing and the available benefits.
220. If the employees who work at the second plant constituted the majority
and had voted as a bloc, this would have been the result.
221. 609 F.2d at 326-28.
222. Id. at 327.
223. Id. at 330.
224. Id. at 335. For a discussion of the relationship between good faith and




trades of arguably meritorious grievances, however, should be
accompanied by notice to and participation of the affected
parties.
The split decision illustrates the difficulty of having courts
determine whether a grievance is meritorious. Each side cited
arbitration cases in which similar grievances had been upheld
or denied.225 In this case, however, the court's job was consid-
erably easier because the union itself had already determined
that the grievance was meritorious before relinquishing it.226
Thus, the union admitted trading away benefits that the con-
tract gave one group to obtain benefits for another employee
group, effecting a benefit redistribution in contravention of the
contract terms. Under the fair process model, rather than de-
bate the underlying contract interpretation itself, the court
should have noted the union's own judgment and held that the
union could not abandon the grievance without consulting the
affected employees. The court could have found a breach in
the union's failure to notify the grievants of the proposed trade-
off, which prevented them from participating in the decision.
When, as in Buchholtz, a union fails to provide fair process by
failing to allow participation before a trade, the court could pur-
sue another desirable avenue: order arbitration, thereby chan-
nelling the decision of contract interpretation to the most
appropriate decisionmaker, the arbitrator.
IV. CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE FAIR
PROCESS MODEL
The proposal advanced by this Article can be summarized
as follows:
A union should be required to take whatever steps
are necessary to determine the merits of a grievance
before abandoning it. In fact-based grievances, the
union's duty is to determine whether the facts support
the grievance. Because resolution of fact questions
usually involves no conflict with interests of other em-
ployees, the union's appropriate role is as an investiga-
tor and fact finder. In grievances based on contract
interpretation, in which conflicting employee interests
are present, unions should be accorded greater discre-
tion. A union should be required to listen to the griev-
ant's case in order to determine its merit. If the union
225. Id. at 325-26, 330.
226. Id. at 319.
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finds, based on the plain language of the contract, that
the grievance is "clearly meritorious," the union should
advance the grievance despite any majority pressures,
because not to advance the grievance would unjustifi-
ably redistribute benefits under the contract in the spe-
cific case and undermine employee confidence in
contracts generally. If the union finds the grievance is
nonmeritorious, it may abandon the grievance or trade
it for some other benefit. If the union finds the griev-
ance is only "arguably meritorious" and the union has
accorded the grievant the opportunity to make his or
her case, the union may decide not to press the
grievance.
The reviewing court's role is one level removed
from determining the merits of the grievance. In all ex-
cept extreme cases, the court should allow the union's
determinations of merit to stand, even if the court
would have found the merits differently. The reviewing
court's primary role is to ascertain whether the union
took the necessary steps to determine the grievance's
merits. One necessary step is to allow the employee to
make his or her case to the union. A union's failure to
take the necessary steps to determine merit is "arbi-
trary" conduct because it denies the grievant fair pro-
cess. One complete defense to the charge of arbitrary
conduct is that, after considering the grievant's case,
the union found that the grievance was not "clearly
meritorious." Any doubts about the union's evaluation
of the merits should be resolved in the union's favor. A
second defense to the charge of breach is that, al-
though the union found the grievance was "clearly
meritorious," exigent circumstances allow the union to
redistribute benefits and the redistribution decision
was made with the affected parties' participation. The
court's inquiry here is limited to ascertaining the facts
of exigency and participation, and does not extend to
evaluating the resulting distribution of benefits. A
court should find a breach only in the relatively rare
circumstance when, after resolving all doubts in the
union's favor, the court determines that, under the
plain language of the contract, the grievance benefit
was clearly due and the union provides no compelling
reason for setting aside contract terms arrived at by
the normal procedure. The specificity of language pro-
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vides the reviewing court's guide; the court need not
and should not look behind clear contract language to
inquire whether a trading process actually led to the
adoption of the language.
Court review under the fair process standard is basically
procedural, yet federal labor policy should structure procedural
requirements to promote fairer substantive results. This goal
of promoting fairer substantive results raises the question
whether the standard goes too far or not far enough in involv-
ing the courts in union decisions.
Because the proposal limits a court to examining whether
the union has gone through the steps necessary to make a de-
termination on the merits, there is a possibility that a union
may go through the motions perfunctorily, without ever really
considering the merits at all. Of course, a union is still subject
to the "good faith" requirement of Vaca, 227 but the "good faith"
inquiry generally is limited to examining whether there is any
evidence of union animus.228 Since it is very difficult to moni-
tor a union's zealousness, at some point one must assume a
union's good faith in advancing employee interests, or the en-
tire justification for unions as exclusive bargaining agents fails.
The fair process standard does to as far as possible to pro-
mote fair substantive results. First, the fair process standard
creates appropriate incentives for individuals and minorities to
participate in collective bargaining because it gives minorities
the ability to create enforceable contract rights through the use
of clear contract language. Second, by affording affected parties
the opportunity to present their case to the union, the standard
provides the best practical assurance that the union will take
their interests into account, and holds out the chance that the
union will choose to advance the "arguably meritorious" griev-
ance to arbitration. Even if the union chooses not to advance
the grievance, giving the grievant the opportunity to present his
or her claim to the union may promote several more satisfac-
tory ways of resolving the dispute. The opportunity to present
the claim to the union may allow the union to secure the em-
ployee's consent to abandon the grievance, may result in a bet-
ter settlement or compromise with the employer or implicated
interests of other employees, or may simply have the cathartic
effect of allowing the grievant to vent frustration at some work-
related incident. Third, to extend judicial protection to griev-
227. See 386 U.S. at 190.
228. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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ances that are only "arguably meritorious" would mean that
virtually every union determination of a grievance's merit could
be substantively reviewable by a court with the inherent risk
that a court could substitute its own slate of distributional pref-
erences for the distributional preferences of the union repre-
senting the group. Fourth, to the extent that a breach of the
duty of fair representation gives a court jurisdiction to examine
the merits, the duty of fair representation envisions some de-
gree of court involvement in union affairs. Yet the fair process
standard does not involve courts too deeply in union affairs be-
cause a court need not reach the merits when the union has
done so. Under this arrangement, the union maintains the role
of primary policy maker in deciding how to distribute benefits
in "arguably meritorious" cases. In addition, resolving all
doubts in the union's favor protects the union's judgment from
court second-guessing with hindsight.229
The fair process standard proposes how the aperture of
court jurisdiction should be adjusted based on the different rea-
sons for limiting and allowing court review. The reason for lim-
iting court review is to preserve unions' exclusive control of
access to arbitration; a union must be able to control access in
order to ensure that conflicting employee claims do not weaken
either collective employee strength or the arbitration machin-
ery necessary for enforcing legitimate claims.230 The reason for
allowing court review is to prevent unions from exercising con-
trol in such a manner as to benefit dominant groups at the ex-
pense of individual grievants without regard to the legitimacy
of their claims.
Since this adjustment allows more cases to be heard than
would a purely subjective standard or a negligence standard,
the fair process standard is subject to the criticisms that it re-
quires too great a commitment of judicial resources, that it will
induce arbitration of too many claims, and that it is too burden-
some to unions. As to the first criticism, whether this standard
requires too great a commitment of judicial resources depends
on one's point of reference. In the absence of a voluntarily
agreed upon arbitration system, courts would be required to
hear all suits for breach of contract.23 ' This standard saves
courts from making determinations on the merits in all cases
where either arbitrators or unions have done so. Of those cases
brought, the focus on process assures that a court's inquiry will
229. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
230. See supra text accompanying note 39.
231. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
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be manageable, since courts are not required to engage in an
open-ended balancing of interests. Moreover, the standard pro-
vides an affirmative formulation for union conduct in a wide va-
riety of grievances, resolving some of the uncertainty in current
law. This clearer definition of a union's legal duty should re-
duce the amount of litigation as unions adapt to a consistent
standard. Furthermore, if the standard is successful in promot-
ing greater employee satisfaction, the standard should reduce
the number of suits brought by employees disgruntled with the
grievance/arbitration process. The hope is that the sanction
will improve union representation and result in fewer cases be-
ing brought.
Adoption of the standard may result in some additional ar-
bitration, as unions, mindful of their charge to consider the
merits of grievances, may decide to arbitrate some marginal
cases. This result is preferable, however, to increased court liti-
gation of the same doubtful cases. Difficult cases are best chan-
nelled to arbitration, rather than to courts, since the precedent
set by arbitration will be more limited. It is uncertain whether
the marginal increase in arbitration will constitute any signifi-
cant burden on the system, and the effect can only be deter-
mined by empirical research. The standard is fully responsive
to the Supreme Court's concern with overburdening arbitra-
tion, however, since unions can continue to determine which
grievances are nonmeritorious and eliminate them from the
system.
As with all standards of due process, the fair process stan-
dard may impose some additional cost on unions in terms of
time and effort in processing grievances. Any incremental cost
to a union, however, must be balanced against the value of the
grievant's expectation of fairness. By terminating a grievance
prior to arbitration, the union precludes the employee from the
arbitration tribunal, the industrial counterpart to one's day in
court. Listening to the employee's arguments and evaluating
their merits is a relatively small burden on the union, when
compared to the benefit to the employee of having such an op-
portunity to be heard. Moreover, requiring the union to evalu-
ate the merits of the grievance need not be burdensome, since
the union can minimize institutional costs in several ways.
Some of the cost of time and effort can be shifted to the griev-
ant by requiring the grievant to furnish the material facts when
the grievance is filed. Some evidence gathering can be dele-
gated to the grievant as well. If the grievant fails to pursue the
grievance, the grievant cannot later accuse the union of breach-
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ing its duty of fair representation. Evaluation of grievances
based on contract interpretation may require a greater commit-
ment of union time to read the applicable contract language
and listen to the grievant's argument. This task can be done in-
formally; there is no need to furnish the grievant with a plenary
hearing.
More important, unions should not view this additional
burden as contrary to their institutional interests. Much of the
benefit of increased employee satisfaction from better union
representation will flow back to the union. The expenditure of
time to listen to grievants' claims or to allow employee partici-
pation in redistribution decisions will make the union more vis-
ible to its constituency and should instill greater confidence in
its effectiveness. Whether imposing sanctions on unions under
this standard will result in improved union representation will
be affected by whatever remedies the Supreme Court eventu-
ally determines to be appropriate. 232 A finding that a union
breached its duty of fair representation should lift the bar of
finality to allow the grievant to litigate or arbitrate the case, but
a finding of breach need not and should not result in an unnec-
essarily heavy sanction and should not in any case result in lia-
bility disproportionate to the nature of union error.
23 3
232. The appropriate remedy for breach of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation in a hybrid § 301 action is still undetermined. The union may not be held
liable for punitive damages. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442
U.S. 42 (1979). However, the union may be held primarily liable for that part of
a wrongfully discharged employee's damages caused by his union's wrongful
failure to arbitrate. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
In Bowen, the Court affirmed an apportionment of back pay between the em-
ployer and the union based on a division of the time periods. The employer
was held liable for the period from the date the employee was wrongfully dis-
charged until the date the grievance would have been arbitrated. The union
was held liable from the date the grievance would have been arbitrated until
the action was reduced to judgment. The legal impact of the Bowen decision is
unclear because the Court failed to delineate the consequences of being pri-
marily rather than secondarily liable, see id. at 595 n. 12, and because the union
failed to object to the trial court's jury instruction apportioning liability on the
basis of time periods. The Court specifically reserved decision on the issue of
whether the trial court's jury instruction was proper.
233. The Supreme Court's decision in Bowen can be criticized on these
grounds. The Court allowed an apportionment of backpay to stand under a
rule that will result in unions bearing the majority of the backpay damages in
most wrongful discharge cases. In Bowen, the award was left to stand despite
the fact that a special jury verdict on punitive damages, which was set aside
following the Foust decision, indicated that the jury believed the employer's ac-
tions were more egregious than the union's. Although the Supreme Court cited
improvement of the quality of the union's representation efforts as one of the
reasons for its approval of the apportionment, the Supreme Court appeared to
be unaware of the potential consequences of this apportionment rule on a
union's willingness to agree to grievance/arbitration or its willingness to pre-
serve the arbitration machinery by weeding out doubtful cases. A further con-
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Otherwise, the ability of unions to advance the interests of em-
ployees would be crippled by a limitation designed to improve
the quality of their representational efforts.
Other advantages of the proposed standard are evident
when one evaluates it against the criteria by which the appro-
priateness of all dispute resolution mechanisms should be
judged-the system's capability to render accurate decisions
and the satisfaction of the parties whose interests are affected
by the process. Employee satisfaction is particularly important
to smooth labor relations. Dean Shulman has noted that a sys-
tem that is perceived as unfair or ineffective in correcting meri-
torious grievances will not promote industrial peace.23 4
Under the proposal, greater accuracy of decisionmaking
can be achieved without undermining the union's collective
strength. Because the union is expected to search for meritori-
ous grievances under the standard, more meritorious griev-
ances should be arbitrated and remedied, resulting in greater
enforcement of employees' legitimate expectations in contract
terms. Since the best solution to a dispute allocates to each
party those contract benefits in which the party has a reason-
able expectation or vested right,235 the grievance/arbitration
process should result in remedies for meritorious grievances.
Terminating a clearly meritorious grievance prior to arbitration
results in allocating a benefit or detriment "incorrectly." A
standard that requires the union to sift for clearly meritorious
grievances should increase the likelihood that meritorious
grievances will be arbitrated and remedied without resort to
suit. This benefit is achieved under the fair process standard
without jeopardizing the union's ability to act in the group's in-
sequence may be some hesitation on the part of courts or juries to find union
breach in situations where the employee has been wronged because the finding
of breach carries such a heavy sanction.
234. See Shulman, supra note 143, 1016-17. Spealdng in the context of the
role of arbitration, Dean Shulman emphasized the need for striving for em-
ployee acceptance and satisfaction with the system. He used words which are
equally applicable to a grievance which is terminated by the union short of
arbitration:
The important question is not whether the parties agree with the [deci-
sion] but rather whether they accept it, not resentfully, but cordially
and willingly. Again, it is not to be expected that each decision will be
accepted with the same degree of cordiality. But general acceptance
and satisfaction is an attainable ideal.
Id. at 1019.
In arguing that the arbitrator should provide a reasoned opinion along with
the arbitration award, Dean Shulman observed, "it is the rank and file that
must be convinced. For the temptation to resort to job action is ever present
and is easily erupted." Id. at 1021.
235. See A. CoRBIN, CoRmN ON CoNTmAcms § 1 (1952).
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terests, since the union retains a wide range of discretion
where it is most needed, in the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement and the settlement of disputes between
conflicting employee groups.
Second, and perhaps more important than greater accuracy
of decisionmaking, the standard should promote greater em-
ployee satisfaction with the fairness of the grievance process.
The standard coincides with an employee's expectations that
the grievance outcome will be based on honest appraisals of his
or her claim rather than on favoritism, on the grievant's per-
sonal political clout within the union, or on procedural techni-
calities. Given the union's structure and the inherent problem
of conflicts of interests among employees, the union will not be
able to please all employees all the time; yet providing a basi-
cally fair process to individual or minority group grievants is a
step the union can take that does not conflict with other em-
ployees' interests.
One could take the purportedly pragmatic position that the
cost of frustrating the expectations of an individual or even a
minority of employees in fair process is not so damaging to the
social fabric of industrial relations as to justify holding the
union to any fair representation duty at all.236 As long as the
majority is satisfied with the union's actions in processing
grievances, the union will maintain its position as exclusive
bargaining agent, and if the majority is not satisfied, the union
will be decertified. In most unions, however, there is no identi-
fiable majority and minority when interests in the terms of the
contract are involved. Rather, there are a multitude of overlap-
ping minorities. Whenever one minority group is deprived of
an expectation, uneasiness may be created in all minority
groups, and as current scholarship suggests, it is very difficult
to predict when the cumulative dissatisfaction over even unre-
lated grievances poses a threat to industrial peace.2M7 This dis-
satisfaction and distrust of the union can take many forms,
from wildcat strikes to small scale sabotage to apathy, any of
which is likely to impair employee morale and productivity and
to undermine union vitality. If a grievance is meritorious and
the grievant's expectations of fair treatment are disappointed,
the employee-grievant will be justifiably frustrated by being ex-
236. See, e.g., Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Repre-
sentation, 17 LAB. L.J. 604, 615 (1966).
237. See, e.g., J. KUHN, BARGAInING AND GPEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961); Atle-
son, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Functions of
Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 750 (1973).
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cluded from the process of deciding whether to arbitrate his or
her grievance,238 and even one dissatisfied employee can dam-
age morale and diminish productivity by engaging in those an-
tisocial actions which the grievance mechanism was developed
to avoid.
The fair process standard, more than any other standard
consistent with the notion of a duty of fair representation, will
raise the level of employee satisfaction, because in each case
the employee is assured fair process: a decision on the merits
by the arbitrator, the union, or the court and participation in
any effort to redistribute benefits. The goal of federal labor pol-
icy is to promote labor peace, and issues of labor peace lead in-
evitably to issues of labor justice. Adoption of the fair process
standard should lead to greater labor justice.
238. See supra text accompanying note 18-19.
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